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iABSTRACT
LaCROIX, EMILY. June 2011. Applying Fair Division to Global Carbon Emission
Permit Markets. Departments of Economics andMathematics.
The world climate policy debate has come to a political standstill between devel-
oped and developing countries. They cannot agree on a “fair” manner to decide how
much each country is allowed to pollute, and who should pay for pollution abate-
ment costs. The United States and developed countries believe that all countries
should participate and reduce their carbon dioxide emissions to their 1990 levels be-
cause everyonewill benefit. By contrast, developing countries believe that developed
countries should be required to do the majority of the emission abatement because
they cause the majority of the pollution.
Carsten Helm [2008] proposed an unconventional emission trading scheme that
uses fair division (or cake-cutting), a mathematical tool for dividing up a common
resource in a manner that the recipients believe is fair. Helm sets out four equity cri-
teria to bemet by a fair division of pollution allowances–Pareto efficiency, individual
rationality, stand-alone upper bound, and envy-freeness. He developed a fair divi-
sion method, the “bounded Walrasian solution,” to meet these criteria. Each coun-
tries appropriate transfer payment is determined from its marginal abatement cost
curve and its initial pollution allowances. With Helm’s method, all countries partic-
ipate in pollution abatement, but it turns out that developing nations are fully com-
pensated for their incremental abatement costs through emission trading. The key
difference between Helm’s scheme and a conventional cap-and-trade system is the
stand-alone upper bound, which imposes that no country should be better off than
if it consumes the entire common resource.
My thesis examines Helm’s application of fair division equity criteria to the divi-
sion of emission permits. I use actual carbon dioxide emission data and estimated
marginal cost abatement data to simulate a market with a subset of ten countries. I
apply Helm’s emission trading scheme to the simulated market and observe the re-
sults. I analyze the market outcome and discuss whether this is a feasible solution
for controlling global carbon dioxide pollution.
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Chapter 1
Indroduction
The world climate change debate is everything but a simple matter. It crosses al-
most every discipline, and has the possibility of affecting the entire world. With so
many different issues and opinions it is easy to understand why the climate policies
have come to a political standstill in recent years. Global warming is human-induced
climate change through the accumulation of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere since industrialization. Even though climate change is a natural process,
the changes that are predicted to occur within the next 100 years will be extremely
rapid; the IPCC believe that the average global temperature increase will be from 1.8
to 4.0◦ [IPCC 2007]. The effects of global warming are already being felt with the re-
treat of glaciers, weather related disasters, and changing precipitation patterns, but
they will get significantly worse if nothing is done to mitigate greenhouse gas emis-
sions.
Globalwarming is the result of amarket failure. Greenhouse gas emissions are ex-
ternalities because the emitter does not internalize the full costs, like climate change.
Since the climate is a public good (non-exclusive and non-rivalrous), markets do not
automatically create a socially optimal equilibrium. Without regulation, individu-
1
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als and firms will exploit public goods. This means that independent individuals
and firms behave in their own self-interest consuming and inevitably depleting the
public good, even though it is in the collective long-run interest of the group to not
deplete the resource below its sustainable level. In global warming, the climate and
environment are suffering from the tragedy of the commons. It is in everyone’s in-
terest to stop climate change in the long run, but self-interest leads countries to still
increase greenhouse gas emissions because there is no incentive for polluters to re-
duce their emissions for fear of free riders. Free riders are those who benefit from the
actions of others, without contributing. In terms of global warming, countries are
unwilling to reduce emissions to slow global climate change, if other (free-riding)
countries are not willing to contribute, as well. The free rider countries would enjoy
the benefits of slowed climate change, but not have to do the work.
In order to encourage pollution abatement and internalize emission costs, gov-
ernments and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) implementmarket-based ap-
proaches, like cap-and-trade and carbon taxes, to provide economic incentives. Gov-
ernments and IGOs must fill the important role of regulator to counteract the global
warming market failure. These regulatory bodies set an abatement target–a certain
amount of global emission reduction–that could bemet in a number of ways, includ-
ing through the market-based approaches mentioned above. This abatement target
should eventually bring greenhouse gas emissions back down to a reasonable level,
where climate change is slowed or stopped.
Ever since the Kyoto Protocol theworld climate policy debate has come to a polit-
ical standstill with countries unwilling to fully commit to their individual abatement
targets. They cannot agree on a “fair” manner to decide how much each country is
allowed to pollute, and who should pay for pollution abatement costs. My thesis ex-
amines an unconventional emission trading scheme proposed byHelm [2008]. It ap-
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plies fair division (or cake-cutting) properties to the division of emission allowances
in order to come up with a “fair” final allocation of the common resource that all
participants agree upon. These properties (or equity criteria) are Pareto efficiency,
individual rationality, envy-freeness, and the stand-alone upper bound. The key dif-
ference between Helm’s scheme and a conventional cap-and-trade system is that it
satisfies the stand-alone upper bound, which requires that no country should be bet-
ter off than it would be if it consumes the entire common resource.
This thesis examinesHelm’s application of the fair division equity criteria. We use
actual carbon dioxide emission data and estimated marginal cost abatement data to
simulate a market. We then apply Helm’s emission trading scheme to a simulated
market of 10 countries and observe the results. We found that Helm’s scheme creates
a significantly differentmarket outcome than a conventional cap-and-trade scheme.
Surprisingly, we found that both per capita and proportional initial entitlements lead
to violations of the stand-alone upper bound, and require a redistribution of utility
among countries. We also suggest that there should be further research into other
justifiable rules for the division of initial entitlements between agents. Although
we assume that per capita and proportional initial entitlements are justifiable rules,
most likely there is still a more appropriate method for dividing initial entitlements,
like proportional to current emissions.
Chapter 2 of this paper discusses the background of global warming, its debate,
and current and potential abatement programs. Chapter 3 discuss the literature on
abatement programs, focusing on their respective efficiencies and issues. Chap-
ter 4 is an in-depth description and discussion of Helm’s abatement program and
the model to be used. Chapter 5 describes the data and measure to be used in the
global emission allowance market simulation. Chapter 6 discusses the results from
the simulation. The paper concludes with Chapter 7, which discusses the feasibility
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of Helm’s bounded Walrasian solution as an answer to fair global abatement efforts.
Lastly, the appendix holds all the data and results tables.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter discusses background information about climate change and pos-
sible mitigation policies. This background is necessary to fully understand the prob-
lems that climate change pose, and the issues with current carbon reduction meth-
ods that are proposed as potential solutions.
2.1 The Debate
Global warming is going to be extremely expensive to prevent or even slow. The
question is who will pay for and participate in the pollution abatement process. The
fact of the matter is that some developed countries, like the United States, emitted
the majority of greenhouse gases, but now they argue that all countries should par-
ticipate in the pollution reduction because everyone will enjoy the benefits. They
are concerned about free riders, who will receive the benefits of greenhouse gas re-
ductions while not bearing the costs. The United States (during the Clinton and
G.W. Bush years) was especially wary of excluding growing developing countries, like
China and India, from international pollution regulation agreements because they
5
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will be the next big emitters. This is why the Senate did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol
in 1997, and President George W. Bush withdrew the United States’ support for the
Protocol in 2001.
On the other hand, developing countries want the freedom to grow by the fastest
means possible and not be constricted by restricting or reducing their greenhouse
gas emissions. Many were hesitant to participate in the Kyoto Protocol because they
did not want to forego any future economic growth. While this argument is valid in
the sense that developed countries have been using the environment to their advan-
tage for the last 100 years, developing countries are in a very dangerous position if
climate change does continue through the 21st century. Developing countries are
more at risk of being ill-affected by climate change because of their geography, de-
pendence on agriculture, and lack of resources and capital [Stern 2007]. Most devel-
oping countries are located in tropical areas, which will be the hardest hit by climate
change and its corresponding extremes, like monsoons and very high temperatures.
Their dependence on agriculture also puts them at risk because these extreme cli-
mate changes will inevitably affect crops, through floods or draughts. On top of all
this, if these disasters hit a developing country, it will have difficulty coping with the
consequences because of their lack of resources and capital. At this point within the
debate, most countries agree that everyone should be involved in greenhouse gas
emission reductions, but it is still unclear who should pay for it.
2.2 The Science and Uncertainties
Many scientists agree that a 350 parts per million (ppm) atmospheric concen-
trations of CO2 is the safe upper limit [Ackerman et al. 2009]. This is the estimated
highest point at which the world does not feel the effects of global warming. Up
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until about 200 years ago, before the Industrial Revolution, the stable atmospheric
concentration of CO2 was about 275 ppm. In 1990, the world emitted 22.5 million
kilotons, passing the 350 ppm safe upper limit of atmospheric concentration of CO2,
reaching about 354 ppm. This is whymost pollution reductions programs (especially
the Kyoto Protocol) are relative to 1990s emission levels. The 1990 emission level is a
desirable mile marker to measure reductions against because policy makers have an
easy point of reference when justifying emission reductions in order to move back
toward the safe zone of CO2 concentrations. Telling countries that they must reduce
emissions to their 1990 emission levels seems to be a more reasonable request than
some astronomical abatement target, even though they are actually the same reduc-
tion amount. The world produced about 30.6 million kilotons of carbon dioxide in
2007 and currently has a concentration of 388 ppm CO2, which is rising at about 2
ppm a year [350.org 2011]. This means that we must reduce annual CO2 emissions
by more than 8 million kilotons to reach 1990 emission levels, and more to stabilize
and reduce the CO2 atmospheric concentrations.
Uncertainty about global warming and CO2 emission levels creates challenges
when attempting to address the climate change issue because no one actually knows
what the future will hold. Therefore, nations are unwilling to make costly decisions
based on mere speculation. The first big issue with uncertainty is that the actual
effects of global warming and to what degree they will occur are unknown. Even
though scientists believe that 350 ppm is the safe upper limit of atmospheric CO2
concentrations, there is no way to know that this is the correct level or even if the
climate change can be stopped and controlled at this point. There is no proof that the
environmentwill recover and return to the pre-1990s climate onceCO2 emissions are
brought down to a reasonable level.
Even with the uncertainties of climate change and its mitigation, most world
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leaders and policy makers agree that climate change is a pressing world issue and
that it is in everyone’s best interest to find a solution. Currently, there are no global
climate change agreements, but the United Nations participate in annual climate
change summits in hopes of moving toward global mitigation. The next two sections
look at the two opposingmanners of imposing emission reductions–command-and-
control standards andmarket-based emission regulation.
2.3 Command-and-Control Standards
Although the name “command-and-control standards” gives an automatic bad
connotation, they are themost common form of emission reduction policies in both
developed and developing countries. Yet command-and-control is an appropriate
and telling name for the approach of these emission regulations. The “command”
comes from a government or overarching organization that sets a particular stan-
dard or maximum level of pollution, and “control” comes from the monitoring and
enforcement of the standard. Governments feel the need to regulate emissions since
the environment is a public good, i.e., it must be protected from exploitation. There
are three main types of command-and-control standards. First, emission standards
are the most basic and logical emission regulation. They specify a certain maximum
emission level, but do not specify how the standards are met. Second, technology
standards specify certain greener technologies that firms must invest in. Last, ambi-
ent standards specify the maximum allowable concentration of pollutants.
Although command-and-control standards are extremely widespread and com-
mon, they have a number of disadvantages, which is why there has been a shift in
the abatement discussion toward market-based emission regulation. Command-
and-control standards are less cost-effective than market-based regulation because
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firms are not given alternative methods of achieving their abatement targets. For ex-
ample, each power plant in a country must reduce their emissions by 5 percent, but
some plants have a comparative advantage in reducing emissions. Suppose the coal-
burning power plant can reduce ten percent of their emissions at a much lower cost
than the hydroelectric plant can reduce their five percent. It is more cost-effective
for the hydroelectric plant to pay for the additional five percent reduction at the
coal-burning power plant than to reduce the five percent at their own plant. Also
command-and-control standards give no incentive to reduce emissions past the emis-
sion standard. Returning to the above example, obviously the coal-burning power
plant will only reduce its emissions by five percent and not the efficient ten percent.
Thus, the emission standards must constantly be updated, which is difficult to keep
up with because of the time consuming legislation that is required.
2.4 Market-based Emission Regulation
There are two main market-based emission regulation systems–cap-and-trade
and carbon taxes. Bothmethods assign a price to greenhouse gas emissions, which is
an additional cost on firms. This price provides firmswith economic incentives to re-
duce their emission levels, which will inherently raise their operating costs. Market-
based regulation addresses negative environmental externalities, correcting themar-
ket failure by incorporating these external costs of production and consumption into
the market through taxes, or by creating a proxy market for emission rights. These
methods can be used to not only internalize the costs of pollution, but to also reduce
pollution if it is assigned a high enough cost. There has been a growing trend toward
market-based regulations in the last thirty years because they aremore cost-effective
than command-and-control standards [Harrington andMorgenstern 2004].
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The cap-and-trade system (or emission trading) does exactly what it sounds like.
An IGO places an upper limit on greenhouse gas emissions. The property rights
to this pollution are called emission permits, and are allocated to each country in
some fair manner [Nordhaus 2008]. The IGO must use a justifiable method for fair
distribution to encourage maximum participation in the cap-and-trade system. If
countries do not believe the distribution is fair they will simply opt out of the trad-
ing scheme and emit as much as they want. Once all of the permits are allocated,
countries may enter an emission permit trading market. Each country has the op-
tion of buying or selling their permits at any price. This price will inevitably converge
to the price where all countries’ marginal utilities are equal. A country that has high
abatement costs will buy permits from countries that have low abatement costs. This
means certain countries have a comparative advantage in pollution abatement. This
comparative advantage leads to a cost-efficient market because the countries with
the lowest abatement costs end up reducing their emissions.
Carbon taxes place a tax on carbon intensive technologies, including produc-
tion, distribution and use of fossil fuels [Stern 2007]. The tax should equal marginal
damage costs. The tax is in proportion to the technology’s carbon content. The tax
provides an incentive for decreasing carbon emissions while also raising tax rev-
enue, which may be used to promote and research non-carbon technologies. Car-
bon taxes have a few advantages over cap-and-trade; they are flexible so that they
are easily adjusted until a cost-effective tax rate is achieved, and they have lower
compliance costs. Cap-and-trade systems have won the approval of politicians, but
“many economists and consumers prefer carbon tax for its simplicity and impartial-
ity” [Dowdey 2007]. Either way both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade accomplish the
same goal of creating economic incentives to reduce emissions and promote alter-
native energy, like wind, solar, and geothermal.
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The cap-and-trade method has been the most successful emission regulation
method in the international realm. Even though there is no global climate agree-
ment, there have been positive steps toward intergovernmental emission regulation,
first with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, and the European Union Emission Trading
Scheme in 2005. These agreements are important precedents, models, and learn-
ing tools when developing a global climate agreement. The details of both will be
discussed in the next section.
2.5 The Kyoto Protocol and European Union Emission
Trading Scheme
The United Nations has developed a number of international agreements deal-
ing with the mitigation of global carbon emissions over the last twenty years, but
so far the most successful and well known is the Kyoto Protocol. Enacted in De-
cember 1997, the Protocol called for a reduction of six greenhouse gases–carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, hydro-fluorocarbons and per-
fluorocarbons. Annex 1 (or developed) countries agreed to a collective 5.2% reduc-
tion of emissions from their 1990 levels. These reductions can be met through the
flexibility mechanism outlined in the Protocol. Annex 1 countries may reduce ei-
ther within their own border in a manner of their own discretion or internationally
through emission trading, clean development mechanisms, and/or joint implemen-
tation [Schreuder 2009]. Clean development mechanisms are abatement projects
that are hosted in non-Annex 1 (or developing) countries, where as joint implemen-
tation are hosted in other Annex 1 countries. The contributing country receives the
emission reduction in return for paying for the hosted project in the host country.
The idea is that countries with high marginal abatement costs can host projects in
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countries with lower abatement costs, taking advantage of comparative advantages
between countries. These programs encourage cost-effective decisions. Non-Annex
1 countries are held to no obligation under the Kyoto Protocol, which is why the
United States would not ratify it. Countries, like China and India, can continue pol-
luting as much as they want.
Although the Protocol’s implementation and enforcement has been insufficient,
it is still an important development in the move toward a global system of carbon
mitigation because it established the first global burden sharing on climate change.
The largest of the Kyoto Protocol’s faults is that the most powerful country in the
world, the United States, didn’t ratify it. The U.S. did not agree with the Protocol’s
choice to exclude growing developing countries, like China and India, from the re-
quired emission reductions. The U.S. believes that the world’s next biggest emitters
must also be subject to the same rules as industrialized countries. Any successful
climate change mitigation method must have the support of both developing and
developed countries, which will be a major challenge to overcome.
One of themost encouraging outcomes of the Protocol is the establishment of the
European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). European countries that rati-
fied the Protocol organized their own emission trading system, which has effectively
mitigated carbon emission from countries in the European Union. The EUETS is the
largest international emission trading system in the world. The EU ETS functions as
a cap-and-trade system, where there is a uniform price of carbon for greenhouse gas
emissions from specific heavy industries, like energy generation, metal production,
pulp and paper, and cement and bricks [Stern 2007]. The EU ETS has 25 members
that each submit National Allocation Plans (NAPs) that helpwith the EuropeanCom-
mission decision on national permit allocations. Within the EU ETS, firms both buy
the permits and provide annual reports on emissions. The first phase lasted three
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years, 2005-2007, with the permit market worth around $115 billion. The EU ETS
only regulates about 40% of the carbon emissions from the member countries, only
focusing on emissions from heavy industries at this beginning stage of the trading
scheme. Despite this low regulation coverage, the system is on the right track. The
EU ETS has plans for increased reductions in additional industries and sectors in the
future. It is important to note that almost all the countries that are reaching their
Kyoto Protocol emission reduction goals are participating in the EU ETS. The sys-
tem gives hope for more multi-national cooperation and a possible global emission
trading system.
Chapter 3
Literature Review
This chapter reviews the existing literature concerning climate change policies,
such as emission trading, carbon taxes, the Kyoto Protocol, and the EU ETS. The pri-
mary focus is on the differences in efficiency between the opposing policies, and any
useful methods that we may want to incorporate into our model, like initial enti-
tlements proportional to a 5.2% reduction of 1990 emission levels. The last section
explores emission market simulations.
3.1 Emission Trading and Carbon Tax
Gerlagh, and van der Zwaan [2006] compile a survey of carbon emission abate-
ment options–energy savings, less carbon-intensive resources, or carbon capture
technology. They also analyze the following policy instruments–carbon taxes, fos-
sil fuel taxes, renewable energy subsidies, portfolio standards for carbon energy, and
portfolio standards for renewable energy–which are used to implement the differ-
ent carbon abatement options. Unfortunately, the authors do not include emission
trading within the comparison of abatement policy instruments. These instruments
14
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are compared in terms of cost, efficiency and impact on energy supply system. They
find that carbon intensity portfolio standards are the most cost-efficient policy in-
strument because they use the tax revenues as subsidies for non-fossil fuel energy.
The authors conclude that carbon capture and storage methods are undervalued by
most emission abatement methods. This is the main cause of the efficiency differ-
ence between carbon and fossil fuel taxes. Unlike carbon intensity portfolio stan-
dards and carbon taxes, fossil fuel taxes do not take advantage of carbon capture and
storage technologies because there are no economic incentives for the investment.
But the authors note that it is possible to create economic incentives in parallel to a
fossil fuel tax through separate treaties.
Kennedy and Laplante [1999] explore the technological incentives that carbon
taxes and emission trading provide for regulated firms to adopt cleaner technologies
by focusing on the time consistency issues, i.e. policy makers not being able to find
appropriate abatement targets to achieve efficiency. Although the authors note that
the results do not strongly favor one system over the other, they find that the rational
expectations equilibrium with emission taxes gives excessive incentives, where as
emission trading gives weak incentives. How efficient these systems are depends on
whether the function of environmental damage is linear or strictly convex. Their re-
sults suggest that if the damage is linear then theremust be either universal adoption
of new technologies or universal retention of old technologies. On the other hand, if
damage is strictly convex then there must be strict partial adoption of the new tech-
nology. The authors finally conclude that the carbon tax has a possible simplicity
advantage over trading because they do not have to continually adjust the supply
of permits, which can suffer from legislative delays. These points are important be-
cause it speaks to how countries must implement their carbon abatementmeasures.
Policy makers must be aware of possible implementation delays, which throw off ef-
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ficiency. A model that is more flexible with its standards and methods may possibly
achieve efficiency sooner.
Aldy, Ley, and Parry [2008] also discuss the differences between emission taxes
and trading, but they focus more on the design aspect of the systems. The authors
assert that for an international emissions agreement to be considered “successful”
it should be cost-effective, distributionally equal, broadly participated in, generally
agreed upon, well regulated, and have reasonable domestic abatement capabilities.
It appears that although both trading and taxes may meet the first three criteria, a
tax-based systemmay bemuch simpler to implement because it can be opposed up-
stream, i.e. on fuel producers. Upstream implementation leads to simplicity because
the regulators would only have to deal with 2,000-3,000 fossil fuel producing firms
versus all firms that use fossil fuels. It is important to note that the taxes are even-
tually paid by the consumer, but in a indirect manner. They also find that taxes are
better than emission trading schemes when comparing them on the grounds of un-
certainty, and fiscal and distributional issues, but it also depends on the tax policies
and how the revenues are used. On the other hand, emission taxes might be a prob-
lem in the international setting because they may offset changes created by other
energy policies. This so-called “tax-interaction effect” drives product prices upward
and therefore depresses consumers’ purchasing power, which inevitably leads to fur-
ther depression of the labor supply and capital accumulation. Despite these issues,
the authors still argue that a carbon-based tax would have design advantages over
emission trading, especially on an international level because they aremore efficient
at promoting broad participation, especially in developing countries.
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3.2 The Kyoto Scheme
Caplan, Cornes, and Silva [2003] investigate the efficiency of the Kyoto Proto-
col and its programs if a major emitter, like the United States, does not participate.
They find that if any major emitter fails to participate the Kyoto Protocol becomes
inefficient because the country is not held accountable for its carbon emissions and
therefore imposes negative effects on the rest of the world. It is also inefficient be-
cause themajor emitter ismost likely also amajor capital holder, who is not involved
in the resource and permit transfers, so others fall short of their maximum trade
gains. The authors explore a new situation called ’the Ideal Kyoto Protocol,’ which
imposes emission trading in the form of redistributive transfers and global partici-
pation. Therefore, every region participates in the emission trading scheme and the
redistributive transfermechanism should operate only after governments havemade
their policy commitments on how to control their carbon emissions. They find that
the Ideal Kyoto Protocol achieves a Pareto efficient equilibrium on the globalmarket.
The comparison between the Kyoto Protocol with and without the U.S. in this article
shows it is necessary for all countries to participate in trading schemes and emission
abatement efforts.
Bhatti, Lindskow, and Pedersen [2010] examine the distribution of burden shar-
ing for abatement costs under the Kyoto Protocol empirically with anOLS regression.
They are trying to figure outwho is actually paying for the pollution abatement under
the Protocol. They found that countries were compensated for early action. Wealthy
countries (who have the highest emissions), those with high projected growth rates,
and potential EU members have the strictest abatement targets. This article does
not addresses the question of what is actually “fair,” but it enlightens us to the ways
in which the abatement costs were divided among countries. The authors also dis-
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cuss the efficiency hypothesis, which argues that the lower the energy efficiency of
a country, the stricter the reduction requirements are, but they find that it has no
supporting evidence. This means that pollution allowances were not distributed
based on countries’ marginal abatement cost curve. One would hope that the mar-
ket would fix this issue through emission trading because these inefficient countries
would have a comparative advantage in emission reductions. But the point that the
authors make is that the initial negotiations and emission allowances influence who
actually pays for the emission abatement.
Martin [1999] explores one of the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms, called
joint implementation. This program is a very important aspect of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol because the Protocol’s emission trading scheme only involves Annex 1 coun-
tries. Since the emission trading scheme is only between developed countries, it is
not taking advantage of the lowest possible marginal abatement costs, which occur
mostly within developing countries because they have not yet implemented basic
abatement technology and equipment that has been available and required within
developed countries for more than a decade. The joint implementation of energy
projects have potentially important second-round impacts because in order to re-
duce emissions in developing countries more technologically efficient capital is in-
stalled. These impacts often lower prices which leads to an increase in quantity de-
manded and further creates substitution effects. Since these new technologies are
the least emission-intensive, the price effects are most likely to be favorable.
Joint implementation is a possible alternative to emission trading in the sense
that it is based on bilateral abatement and transfer payment agreements, rather than
a global market. But one would hope that such a system would lead to a compet-
itive market outcome, which would in the end be quite similar to emission trad-
ing. The difference is that the Kyoto Protocol used joint implementation instead of
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forcing developing countries to be involved in the emission trading scheme because
they wanted to give developing countries the choice to abate pollution. This further
delves into the policy debate about what is actually fair for developing countries be-
cause they did not cause the majority of the pollution. Martin [1999] finds that joint
implementations is efficient and appears to have a good impact on emission abate-
ment. Like carbon capture and storage emission reduction methods, the question
is if joint implementation can occur on a large enough scale to create large carbon
emission reductions because it is an optional program. This is one of the main rea-
sons why developing countries should participate in the global emission schemes.
Even though joint implementation is an efficient method of reducing emissions, its
optional nature does not force the developing countries to participate. Thus giving
countries a choice decreases the efficiency of the system as compared to if they par-
ticipated in the emission trading scheme with the Annex 1 countries. This was the
U.S.’smajor criticismwith Kyoto; it did not hold developing countries responsible for
their pollution as it did developed countries.
Hagem [2009] discusses the last aspect of the Kyoto Protocol’s scheme for pol-
lution abatement, the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDMs), which is another
flexibility mechanism. Hagem mainly compares the efficiency of emission trading
versus CDMs within developing countries with a focus on the incentives to invest in
new technologies for pollution abatement and their actual gains from investment.
Thus, this article does not focus on the CDMs effect onminimizing developed coun-
tries costs, which is the other aspect of the CDM program. Hagem finds that the
gains from incentives come from developing countries facing either competitive or
noncompetitive output markets. Within a perfectly competitive market, gains from
investment under theCDMs are larger than those under an emission trading scheme.
The reverse is true for an imperfectly competitive market, so gains from investment
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under an emission trading scheme are larger than those under a CDM regime.
3.3 The European Union Emission Trading Scheme
In 2007, the EU began reviewing the EU ETS’s market functions in order to find
areas for improvement. Daskalakis and Markellos [2008] took on this challenge of
assessing the efficiency of the EU ETS for CO2 emissions during its first two years
of operation. They focus on the weak form of efficiency, in which current prices
should reflect all the information in previous prices, i.e. any market forecasts are de-
veloped from themost recent price. They also specifically look at the three largest re-
gional emission exchangemarkets–Powernext (France), EuropeanClimate Exchange
(Netherlands), and Nord Pool (Scandinavia). The results suggest that trade gains
are serially predictable, which can be exploited to produce substantial risk-adjusted
profits. Although markets are not currently consistent with the weak form of effi-
ciency, the authors claim this may be due to the immaturity of the scheme and the
restrictions–short-selling and “banking” emissions permits. Unfortunately, the au-
thors make a very good point for the inefficiencies of the EU ETS, but do not offer
any further suggestions of how the EU should rectify these issues.
Ehrhart, Hoppe, and Loschel [2008] explore the loopholes in emission trading
systems, specifically the EU ETS, and how they affect the efficiency of the program.
The loopholes stem from themisuse of trading institutions, like pooling and project-
based mechanisms. They are called loopholes because they are technically legal
but affect the product market in an unintended manner. In order to analyze the af-
fects of loopholes on the EU ETS they use two game theoretical models that feature
oligopolistic firms that face perfect competition. In thesemodels the firms are always
price takers in the allowance market. The first model is of duopolistic firms that set
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their output levels and then their cost-minimizing abatement levels. It ends up that
comparative advantage leads to firm profits when allowance prices rise. This model
ends up producing a market with a lower production level, high market prices and
higher profits. Thus, the overall social welfare within this system decreases. In the
second model, the duopolistic firms first cooperatively determine their number of
permits and emission levels while simultaneous choosing their product output lev-
els. The firmswithin the secondmodel enjoy comparatively higher profits. This leads
to fewer firms buying permits and abating more than the cost-minimizing model
calls for. Thus, the authors find that loopholes within the system actually foster tacit
collusion, which creates oligopolistic markets. This creates profits for the firm and
has negative social welfare effects. This is a warning for what policy makers should
watch out for within emission trading legislation that could lead to the restriction of
competition and market inefficiencies. The authors note that CDMs are particularly
susceptible to these loopholes.
3.4 EmissionMarket Simulations
Nordhaus [1992] developed the dynamic integrated climate-economymodel (DICE),
which is used to simulate alternative abatement methods. The DICE model is im-
portant because it investigates the implications of economic growth on the environ-
ment. Most simulations of carbonmarkets do not account for the region’s economic
growth and the pressures it would put on the abatement system. Developing coun-
tries are afraid of agreeing to set emission targets because they do not want CO2
emission reductions to constrict their rate of growth. The DICE model uses eco-
nomic growth theory combined with the dynamics of emissions creating a closed-
loop interaction between the climate and economy. Thus, the model accounts for
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the economy through the initial stock of capital, labor and technology and gets the
output from a Cobb-Douglas production function. Further, capital accumulation is
determined by consumption over time, where as population growth and technologi-
cal change are both exogenous. The climate side of themodel is determined by emis-
sion, concentrations, and climate equations, a damage relationship, and a marginal
abatement cost curve.
Nordhaus [1992] also investigates the efficiency differences between five alterna-
tive abatement policies–no controls, optimal policy, ten-year delay of optimal pol-
icy, twenty percent emission reduction from 1990 levels and geo-engineering. Nord-
haus finds that a “modest” carbon tax (i.e. optimal policy) would be efficient. On
the other hand, a twenty percent emission reduction from 1990 levels would be ex-
tremely costly and unrealistic.
Carlen [2003] explores how emission trading will be affected by market power,
and whether large countries would be able to manipulate emission prices. The arti-
cle further discusses the efficiency of emission trading in a transparentmarket where
traders have accurate information about net demand and completes an emission
trading simulation on a subset of 12 countries in order to observe the outcome. In the
market simulations, Carlen uses a dual action (DA) market in which trade is sequen-
tial so sellers and buyersmake bids and ask or accept them from other traders. Thus,
the market may have some price discrimination. Through the simulation, Carlen
found that trade levels and prices actually converge on to competitive levels, and
that a large trader does not create substantial inefficiencies. In the majority of the
trading periods, the traders achieve more than 95% of the maximum trade gains.
Similarly, Stranlund, Murphy, and Spraggon [2008] examine how imperfect en-
forcement affects the efficiency of emission trading markets. They ran laboratory
experiments to simulate risk-neutral profit maximizing firms, who are not in full
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compliance. The experiment was conducted on a volunteer student population at
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. The subjects conducted emission reduc-
tions and transfers on a DA market, but were allowed to have different amounts of
pollution and pollution permits, i.e. imperfect enforcement. The results were then
compared to outcome predictions based on emission trading theory. They found
that their imperfectly enforced emission tradingmarkets were “reasonably” efficient,
but expected penalties were lower than predicted when they should have been high,
but about on par when they should have been low. Although the market has rea-
sonable efficiency when compared to a perfectly enforced emission trading market,
its penalties and violations were lower. Even though the simulation that we run on
Helm’s emission trading scheme will be perfectly enforced, it is important to keep in
mind how the results could be affected if countries exceed their emission allowances.
It brings up the question of penalties and how violations should be handled in the in-
ternational system.
Chapter 4
Model
This chapter introduces fair division problems and the equity criteria required to
have a fair division solution. We examine the fair division problem of carbon emis-
sion permits, and Helm’s bounded Walrasian solution. We prove that the bounded
Walrasian solution guarentees four fair division equity criteria–Pareto efficiency, in-
dividual rationality, envy-freenesswith respect to a compensation rule, and the stand-
alone upper bound.
4.1 Fair Division Problems and Solutions
4.1.1 The Problem
A fair division problem is a homogeneous, scarce, common resource,ω ∈R+, that
must be divided among n agents, I = {1,2, ...,n}. The agents have particular prefer-
ences for the resource,Ui , which are continuous utility functions. Each agent has a
stand-alone utility amount,Ui (ω), that is associated with the utility the agent would
receive if he were to consume the entire common resource. Each agent starts with
an initial nonnegative entitlement allocation of the common resource, ωi , such that
24
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￿
i∈I ωi ≤ω. This fair division problem is defined as E ≡ {Ui ,ωi }i∈I . The point of fair
division is to divide the common resource in a manner that the recipients believe is
fair.
The fair division problem between two players has existed for centuries dating
back to its reference in the Old Testament.
Example 4.1.1.1. (The Story of Abram and his nephew, Lot).
6 And the land could not sustain them while dwelling together, for their
possessions were so great that they were not able to remain together.
7 And therewas strife between the herdsmen of Abram’s livestock and the
herdsmen of Lot’s livestock ...
In this fair division problem, ω is the land, the agents are Abram and Lot, and
ωAbram and ωLot are both zero because neither have any of the land at this point.
Note that this extremely simple problem does not specify preferences,Ui .
4.1.2 The Solution
A fair division solution is a particular way of dividing the common good, ω, so
each agent receives a nonnegative allocation, xi , such that
￿
i∈I xi ≤ω. Thus, define
the solution to E as F ≡ {xi }i∈I .
Example 4.1.2.1. (Returning to the Story of Abram and his nephew, Lot).
8 So Abram said to Lot, "Please let there be no strife between you andme,
nor betweenmy herdsmen and your herdsmen, for we are brothers.
9 "Is not the whole land before you? Please separate from me; if to the
left, then I will go to the right; or if to the right, then I will go to the left."
(Gensis 13: 6-9)
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Lot travelled east, choosing the valley of Jordan, and Abram received the land of
Canaan.
In Abram and Lot’s fair division solution, xAbram is the land to the left and xLot
is the land to the right. Although the agent’s preferences were not specified in the
fair division problem, we can assume that both agents are satisfied with their final
allocation because they agreed to the division. If either agent was unhappy with his
portion, he would have continued arguing for more land.
4.1.3 The Three Equity Criteria of Fair Division
A fair division solution may be subject to many equity criteria, but the three we
discuss here are Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and envy-freeness.
The first and most basic fair division equity criterion is individual rationality. In
layman’s terms, an individually rational solution requires that no agent agrees to an
allocation that makes him worse off than his starting point. This restriction appears
to be common sense, but it is important to include because within a fair division
there should not be any agents who are net losers.
Definition 4.1.3.1. An allocation (xi )i∈I is individually rational if
Ui (xi )≥Ui (ωi ) for all i ∈ I .
To better understandwhatmakes an allocation individually rational, wewill once
again refer to the discussion of Example 4.1.2.1. In order for Abram’s final allocation
to be individually rational, he will only participate in a trade if his utility remains the
same or increases. To illustrate Abrammaking a rational decision we will present an
example where he will not want to participate in the trade.
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Example4.1.3.2. (An Individually RationalDecisionContinuation of Example 4.1.2.1).
Suppose Lot’s valley of Jordan has two wells in the north and Abram’s land of Canaan
has one well in the south as well as one in the north, all of which are close to the di-
vision line between Lot’s and Abram’s lands. Lot proposes a trade of one of his wells
in the north for Abram’s only well in the south. It is easy to see that although Lot will
be better off because because of trade for his herdsmen do not have to travel as far
for water, Abram will be worse off because both his wells will be in the north. Abram
is an individually rational agent if he does not trade his southern well for a north-
ern one. He makes this decision because it will make life much more difficult for his
herdsmen who will not be as productive, and therefore lower the amount of utility
he receives from his lands.
The individual rationality equity criterion places a lower bound on each agent’s
utility, so that each participating agent to guarenteed at least the utility from his ini-
tial allocation.
The second fair division equity criterion is Pareto efficiency. In layman’s terms, a
Pareto efficient solution requires that any change to the solution {(xi )}i∈I that makes
one agent better off must make another agent worse off.
Definition 4.1.3.3. A final allocation (xi )i∈I is Pareto efficient if there does not exist
a feasible allocation (x∗i )i∈I such that
Ui (x
∗
i )>Ui (xi ) for some i ∈ I and
Ui (x
∗
i )≥Ui (xi ) for all i ∈ I .
To better understand what is a Pareto efficient allocation and what is not, we will
return to the dicussion of Example 4.1.2.1. The land division that was decided in
Example 4.1.2.1 is Pareto efficient if there does not exist a trade of lands such at least
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one man is made happier without making the other worse off. Perhaps the easiest
way to understand is an example where Pareto efficiency is not satisfied.
Example 4.1.3.4. (A Non-Pareto Efficient Continuation of Example 4.1.2.1).
Suppose Lot’s valley of Jordan has two wells in the north and Abram’s land of Canaan
has two wells in the south, all of which are close to the division line between Lot’s
and Abram’s lands. If Lot trades one of his wells in the north for one of Abram’s in
the south, both men will be better off because they now both have wells in the north
and south, so their herdsmen do not have to travel as far for water. Thus the initial
division in Example 4.1.2.1 was not Pareto efficient.
On the other hand, if the initial division in Example 4.1.2.1 were Pareto efficient,
at least oneman would not want to trade because he would bemade worse off. Sup-
pose one has already developed an expansive system of aquifers; then he would not
be willing to trade his one of his two wells because both are being used to water all of
lands.
The third equity criterion is envy-freeness.
Definition 4.1.3.5. (The Usual Definition of Envy-freeness.)
An allocation is (xi )i∈I is envy-free if for all pairs of agents i , j ∈ I ,
Ui (xi )≥Ui (x j ).
In layman’s terms, envy-freeness is the property that no agent prefers another
agent’s allocation to his own, i.e. Agent i does not prefer Agent j ’s allocation, x j , over
his own, xi .
To better understand what envy-freeness means, we will return to the discussion
of Abram and Lot. In order for both Lot and Abram to be envy-free, neither should
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want what the other has. To illustrate this, we will return to Example 4.1.3.2 where
one agent, Lot, envies the other, Abram.
Example 4.1.3.6. (An Envy-freeness Violation Continuation of Example 4.1.2.1).
Consider the set up in Example 4.1.3.2, where Lot has two wells in the north and
Abram has one well in the south and one in the north. Since the farthest Abram’s
herdsmenmust travel for water is half way across his lands, where as Lot’smust travel
all the way across his lands to reach a well, bothmen would prefer Abram’s land over
Lot’s. Lot would much rather have Abram’s lands than his own because the herds-
menwould bemuchmore productive if they were not always walking to reach water.
Thus, Lot envies Abram.
Remark 4.1.3.7. If the individual rationality and envy-freeness criteria are satisfied,
it is more likely that all agents would be willing to participate in the fair division so-
lution, instead of wanting to opt out and arguing for an even larger portion of the
common resource.
4.2 Fair Division Algorithms
Mathematicians have developed anumber of fair division algorithms, which guar-
entee a solution satisfies particular equity criteria. In this section, we will discuss the
two most basic and well-known fair division algorithms and their associated solu-
tions.
4.2.1 The Divide-and-ChooseMethod.
The most basic fair division problem is between two agents. When two agents
must “fairly” divide a common resource (e.g. a piece of cake) amongst themselves,
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the simplest solution is to cut the piece of cake in half. But this is only a fair division
solution if both participants have the same preferences. If they have differing pref-
erences, e.g. Agent 1 likes the corner piece because it has more frosting and Agent
2 likes the inside piece because it has the most chocolate, then one participant may
want the other’s pieces of cake compared to his own when the whole cake is simply
halved. Thus the agents employ the Divide-and-Choose Method to find a fair divi-
sion of the cake.
Algorithm 4.2.1.1. (The Divide-and-Choose Method).
Step 1: One agent (either one) cuts the piece of cake where he believes the two pieces
are equal.
Step 2: The other agent chooses whichever piece he believes is equal or greater than
the other.
Therefore both participants are receiving a piece of the cake that each believes is
equal or greater than the other’s [Robertson andWebb 1998].
Returning to 4.1.2.1, the Divide-and-Choose Method is exactly the setup that
Abram proposes. He picked a spot on the land that he would not mind being on the
left or the right side of, and then he let Lot choose whichever side he wanted. Both
men were content with their final piece of land, knowing they thought their pieces
were just as good as or better than the other’s.
It is important to note that the Divide-and-ChooseMethod for two agents results
in an envy-free and proportional division. Proportionality refers to a division out-
come where each agent receives what he believes to be at least 1/nth of the cake.
On the other hand, envy-freeness refers to a division outcome where no agent wants
any other’s allocation compared to his own, i.e., each agent believes his allocation is
preferable to the other agents’ allocations.
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This solution to the two agent fair division problem is quite simple and easily
understood algorithm. Only two decisions are being made: first the cut, and then
the choice.
4.2.2 TheMoving Knife Algorithm.
The jump to the three agent problem is much more difficult than the two agent
problem. The solution is not quite as intuitive as the two agent problem. Although
there are many different algorithms to find a fair division between three agents, we
are presenting theMovingKnife Algorithmbecause it canbe generalized forn agents.
Algorithm 4.2.2.1. (The Moving Knife Algorithm for Three Agents).
Step 1: A knife continuously moves over a piece of cake from left to right. Any agent
who thinks the piece to the left of the knife is 1/3 of the entire cake yells “Cut.” The
knife cuts the cake at this place and this agent receives the cut piece of cake and
drops out of the division algorithm.
Step 2: The next agent who thinks the piece to the left of the knife is 1/3 of the entire
cake yells “Cut.” Again this knife cuts the cake at this place and the agent receives his
cut piece of cake and drops out of the division algorithm.
Step 3: Thefinal agent receives the remaining pieces of cake [Robertson andWebb 1998].
TheMoving Knife Algorithm can be extended to n agents by simply changing 1/3
of the entire cake to 1/n and iterating Step 2 until there is only one agent left, who
moves on to Step 3 and receives the remaining piece of cake. Although this method
achieves proportionality, it does not result in an envy-free division. Even though
each agent is choosing what he believes is a “fair” 1/n piece of cake, the agent who
first yells cut will always have the smallest piece of cake, and may therefore envy
those who cut pieces that are larger afterward.
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Again, consider the story of Abram and Lot (Example 4.1.2.1) and what would
occur if Abram and Lot employed the Moving Knife Algorithm, instead of the divide-
and-choose method.
Example 4.2.2.2. (Abram and Lot using the Moving Knife Algorithm).
To “fairly” divide the land, Abram and Lot begin walking westward from the eastern
boundary of the land. At some point along the way Abram decides that they have
covered half of the land and yells “Cut!” At this point, Abram and Lot put up a fence
perpendicular to the northern boundary that cuts the land in two. Abram receives
the land of Canaan that they just traversed, and Lot receives everything to the west
of the fence, the valley of Jordan.
4.3 The Fair Division of Emission Permits and Helm’s
Model
The fair division problem that we are looking at in this paper is the fair division
of emission permits in a carbon emission trading scheme, i.e. cap-and-trade. As
described earlier, cap-and-trade puts a ceiling on carbon emissions, and creates a
market price for emissionpermits, which countries or firmsmaybuy in a freemarket.
4.3.1 The Fair Division Problem of Emission Permits.
In the fair division problem of emission permits, the common resource, ω, is the
capped number of availible emission permits. The agents are countries participating
in the emission trading scheme. Each country receives a nonnegative entitlement al-
location of emission permits, ωi . The initial permit entitlements are based on a pre-
determined and justifiable entitlementmeasure. For example, each country receives
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a certain number of permits per capita or proportional to their 1990 emission levels.
After the emissions trading, each agent has a final allocation bundle (xi , ti ), where
xi ∈ R+ is the final allocation of emission permits and ti is the transfer payment. A
transfer payment is a monetary value that represents either a revenue for selling ex-
cess permits or expenditure for buying additional permits. In order to find the equi-
librium trading point, each agent has unique preferences that are characterized by
a continuous monotonic and quasilinear utility function,U (xi , ti )= vi (xi )+ ti . This
fair division problem is defined as E ≡ {Ui ,ωi }i∈I . Thus, the solution to E is defined
as F ≡ {xi , ti }i∈I . It is important to note the restrictions on F that ￿i∈I ti = 0 and￿
i∈I xi ￿ω. The first restriction reflects that every transaction involving a monetary
transfer is recorded twice as a negative to the buyer and a positive to the seller. The
latter imposes that the solution xi i∈I is constrained by the common resource, i.e. the
sum of all the agents final allocations of emission permits may not be larger than the
common resource, ω.
The solution F to the fair division of emission permitsmay be subject to the three
equity criteria discussed in Section 4.1.3.
Definition 4.3.1.1. An allocation (xi , ti )i∈I is individually rational for E if
vi (xi )+ ti ≥ vi (ωi ) for all i ∈ I .
Remark 4.3.1.2. It is important to note that the definition of individual rationality
within a trading scheme is recursive. This means if the agents in I were to partici-
pate in an additional trading scheme, E ￿, after the initial trade, E , then an allocation
(x ￿i , t
￿
i )i∈I is individually rational for E
￿ if
vi (x
￿
i )+ t ￿i ≥ vi (xi )+ ti for all i ∈ I .
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Definition 4.3.1.3. An allocation (xi , ti )i∈I is Pareto efficient if there does not exist a
feasible allocation (x∗i , t
∗
i )i∈I such that
vi (x
∗
i )+ t∗i > vi (xi )+ ti for some i ∈ I and
vi (x
∗
i )+ t∗i ≥ vi (xi )+ ti for all i ∈ I .
Definition 4.3.1.4. An allocation is (xi , ti )i∈I is envy-free if for all pairs of agents i , j ∈
I ,
vi (xi )+ ti ≥ vi (x j )+ t j .
There is an interesting proposition that we can derive directly from Pareto effi-
ciency within a trading scheme.
Since agents’ utility functions,U (xi , ti )= vi (xi )= ti are quasilinear, transfer pay-
ments are valued in the same manner as the utility of emission permits. Assuming
that lump-sum transfer payments are feasibly, the Pareto efficiency equity criterion
imposes that a solution (xi , ti )i∈I is Pareto efficient if there exists no other feasible
allocation (x∗i , t
∗
i )i∈I such that
￿
i∈I
(vi (x
∗
i ))+ t∗i >
￿
i∈I
(vi (xi )+ ti ). (4.3.1.5)
Lump-sum transfers can be used as a method to redistribute utility between agents
in the form of money without losing efficiency.
Proposition 4.3.1.6. Given the assumption that lump-sum transfers are feasible, an
allocation (xi , ti )i∈I is Pareto efficient if and only if it maximizes the sum of utility
across agents.
To prove Proposition 4.3.1.6, wewill actually prove the negation, i.e. an allocation
is not Pareto efficient⇔ the sum of utility across agents is not maximized.
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Proof. (⇒) Suppose (xi , ti )i∈I is not Pareto efficient. Then there exists an allocation
(x ￿i , t
￿
i )i∈I such that
vi (x
￿
i )+ t ￿i > v j (x j )+ t j for some j ∈ I (4.3.1.7)
vi (x
￿
i )+ t ￿i ￿ vi (xi )+ ti for all i ∈ I (4.3.1.8)
Wemust show that the sum of utility is not maximized across agents, i.e., that
￿
i∈I
vi (x
￿
i )+ t ￿i >
￿
i∈I
vi (xi )+ ti .
From Equation (4.3.1.8), we have
￿
i∈I
vi (x
￿
i )+ t ￿i ≥
￿
i∈I
vi (xi )+ ti .
But from Equation (4.3.1.7), we know
￿
i∈I
vi (x
￿
i )+ t ￿i >
￿
i∈I for i ￿= j
[vi (xi )+ ti ]+ v j (x j )+ t j .
i.e. (xi , ti )i∈I does not maximize the sum of utility across agents.
(⇐) Suppose (xi , ti )i∈I does notmaximize the sumof utility. Then there exists (x ￿i , t ￿i )i∈I
such that ￿
i∈I
vi (x
￿
i )+ t ￿i >
￿
i∈I
vi (xi )+ ti .
We must show (xi , ti )i∈I is not Pareto efficient. We must produce an allocation
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(xˆi , tˆi )i∈I such that
(a) vi (xˆi )+ tˆi > vi (xi )+ ti for some i ∈ I and
(b) vi (xˆi )+ tˆi ≥ vi (xi )+ ti for all i ∈ I .
Let W = {w ∈ I |vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w ≥ vw (xw )+ tw } andL = {l ∈ I |vl (x ￿l )+ t ￿l < vl (xl )+ tl }.
If L = ￿, we are done because all agents are in W , i.e. vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w ≥ vw (xw )+ tw ,
which satisfies (b), and as
￿
i∈I vi (x ￿i )+ t ￿i >
￿
i∈I vi (xi )+ ti , we know vi (xˆi )+ tˆi >
vi (xi )+ ti for some i ∈ I , which satisfies (a).
AssumeL is nonempty. Define
W = ￿
w∈W
￿
vw (x
￿
w )+ t ￿w − vw (xw )− tw
￿> 0 and
L = ￿
l∈L
￿
vl (xl )+ tl − vl (x ￿l )− t ￿l
￿> 0.
W is all the utility gained because of the trade, where as L is all the utility lost
because of the trade. Further, we know W − L > 0, which is the net gain in total
utility inmoving from (xi , ti )i∈I to (x ￿i , t
￿
i )i∈I . Wewill redistribute among utility agents
through the transfer payments, so that all agents are at least as well off as with the
initial allocation. But we will also make sure that the new allocation produced by the
redistribution has the same utility as (x ￿i , t
￿
i )i∈I .
Define r , such that 0 ≤ r = LW < 1. Let an additional transfer payment for the
winners be τw =−r [vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w − vw (xw )− tw ]. Let an additional transfer payment
for the losers be τl = [vl (xl )+ tl − vl (x ￿l )− t ￿l ]. Consider the allocation (x ￿i , t ￿i +τi )i∈I .
Now, we must prove the following four claims:
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Claim 4.3.1.9. Wemust show that (x ￿i , t
￿
i +τi )i∈I is a feasible allocation, i.e.
￿
i∈I
(t ￿i +τi )= 0.
We know
￿
i∈I t ￿i = 0 as (x ￿i , t ￿i )i∈I is a feasible allocation. Thus we must show
￿
i∈I
τi = 0.
We have
￿
i∈I
τi =
￿
w∈W
τw +
￿
l∈L
τl
= ￿
w∈W
−r [vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w − vw (xw )− tw ]+
￿
l∈L
[vl (xl )+ tl − vl (x ￿l )− t ￿l ]
=−r ￿
w∈W
[vw (x
￿
w )+ t ￿w − vw (xw )− tw ]+
￿
l∈L
[vl (xl )+ tl − vl (x ￿l )− t ￿l ]
=−rW +L
=− L
W
(W )+L
= 0
Claim 4.3.1.10. We must show if w ∈ W , then vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w +τw > vw (xw )+ tw . Let
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w ∈W be arbitrary. We have
vw (x
￿
w )+ t ￿w +τw − vw (xw )− tw = vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w − r
￿
vw (x
￿
w )+ t ￿w − vw (xw )− tw
￿− vw (xw )− tw
= vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w − r vw (x ￿w )− r t ￿w + r vw (xw )+ r tw − vw (xw )− tw
= vw (x ￿w )− r (vw (x ￿w ))+ t ￿w − r (t ￿w )− vw (xw )+ r (vw (xw ))− tw + r (tw )
= (1− r )vw (x ￿w )+ (1− r )t ￿w − (1− r )(vw (xw )− (1− r )tw )
= (1− r )￿vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w − vw (xw )− tw )￿
> 0
as 0< r < 1 and vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w − vw (xw )− tw )> 0 by definition of w ∈W .
Thus, vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w +τw ≥ vw (xw )+ tw for all w ∈W .
Claim 4.3.1.11. Wemust show if l ∈L , then vl (x ￿l )+ t ￿l +τl ≥ vl (xl )+ tl . Let l ∈L be
arbitrary. We have
vl (x
￿
l )+ t ￿l +τl = vl (x ￿l )+ t ￿l + [vl (xl )+ tl − vl (x ￿l )− t ￿l ]
= vl (xl )+ tl for all l ∈L .
Claim 4.3.1.12. Let LW < r < 1. Define τw = −r [vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w − vw (xw )− tw ] and τl =
vl (xl )+ tl − vl (x ￿l )− t ￿l + 1|L | (rW −L). Then we must show vi (x ￿i )+ t ￿i +τi ≥ vi (xi )+ ti
for all i ∈ I . We know vw (x ￿w )+ t ￿w +τw ≥ vw (xw )+ tw for all w ∈W by Claim 4.3.1.10.
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Let l ∈L be arbitrary. We have
vl (x
￿
l )+ t ￿l +τl − vl (xl )− tl = vl (x ￿l )+ t ￿l +
￿
vl (xl )+ tl − vl (x ￿l )− t ￿l +
1
|L | (rW −L)
￿
− vl (xl )− tl
= 1|L | (rW −L)
> 1|L | (
L
W
W −L)
> 0 for all l ∈L because we assumed L is nonempty.
Thus, vi (x ￿i )+ t ￿i +τi ≥ vi (xi )+ ti for all i ∈ I .
4.3.2 TheWalrasian Equilibrium
The Walrasian equilibrium is a vector consisting of the commodity price and an
allocation of the resource to agents in a competitive market such that each agent
maximizes his own utility function. But this maximization is contrained because the
equilibriummust ‘clear themarket’, whichmeans equating aggregate supply and de-
mand for the traded commodity. Note that since it is a competitive market, no agent
has the power or influence to affect the market price. The Walrasian equilibrium is
the market equilibruim used in cap-and-trade schemes.
Within an emission trading scheme, a Walrasian equilibrium is found by agents
maximizing their utility according to the price. The price is found where marginal
utility is equal across all agents. The maximizing transfer payment is found my the
maximization of the utility function where their revenue and expenditure for the
emissionpermits are calculated bymultiplying the change in an agent’s permit quan-
tity by the price, ti = p(ωi −xi ).
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Definition 4.3.2.1. Let the allocation (xi )i∈I and the price p ∈ R+ constitute a Wal-
rasian equilibrium for E . Then for all pairs of agents i , j ∈ I :
vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi )≥ vi (x j )+p(ωi −x j ).
This means that if (xi )i∈I is a Walrasian equilibrium, then agent i ’s utility is max-
imized across all agents, i.e. agent i has chosen xi rather than x j because he will
receive higher utility for xi than for x j .
The the resource allocation from a Walrasian equilibrium is a useful solution to
the fair division problem for emission permits because it has a number of well known
economic conclusions. Themost important is that theWalrasian allocations are both
Pareto efficient and individually rational.
Note 4.3.2.2. It is well known that allocations from the Walrasian equilibrium are
both Pareto efficient and individually rational [Arrow and Debreu].
Although the Walrasian equilibrium has a number of useful properties, it runs
into some difficulties when addressing the fair division of emission permits. The
first andmost important issue is that theWalrasian equilibriummay cause agents to
be overcompensated, meaning they profit from the trading scheme.
Definition 4.3.2.3. An agent is overcompensated at an allocation (xi , ti )i∈I if
vi (xi )+ ti > vi (ω).
An agent is overcompensated if he receives a utility that makes he better off than
if he were to consume the entire common resource on his own. Overcompensation
contradicts the “fairness” of fair division because agents may use the trading sys-
tem to their benefit. To address this overcompensation issue, Carsten Helm (2008)
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introduced a fourth equity criterion, the stand-alone upper bound, which will be
discussed in the next section.
The second issue with the Walrasian equilibrium is that it does not guarentee
an envy-free allocation. If allocations are not envy-free, agents may not be willing
to participate in the trading scheme because they would rather argue for a larger
portion of the emission permits (Remark 4.1.3.7). This will be discussed in Section
4.3.5.
4.3.3 The Fourth Equity Criterion
Carsten Helm [2008] introduces a fourth equity criterion to the fair division of
emission permits, the stand-alone upper bound. The upper bound is used to ensure
that there are no overcompensated agents within the trading scheme. The stand-
alone upper bound is not a usual requirement for theWalrasian solution, so it is very
important that we later prove our solution to the fair division problem meets this
restriction.
Definition 4.3.3.1. An allocation (xi , ti )i∈I satisfies the stand-alone upper bound for
E if
vi (xi )+ ti ≤ vi (w) for all i ∈ I .
The stand-alone upper bound puts a limit on the total of the transfer payments
that an agent can receive for selling his intitial entitlements. This guarentees that
there are no overcompensated agents within the system. So no one is allowed to
profit from exploiting the needs of other agents.
Example 4.3.3.2. Suppose Agent 1 and Agent 2 participate in an emission permit
trading scheme with 100 permits that cost $25 each. Both agents’ utility functions
areUi (xi , ti )= 10xi + ti , where ti = p(ωi −xi ). The agent’s beginning and final permit
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allocations and corresponding utilities are defined in the table below. Using Defini-
Table 4.3.1: Descriptive Table for Example 4.3.3.2
Agents vi (ω) ωi xi vi (xi ) vi (x j ) ti Ui (xi , ti )
1 1000 50 0 0 500 $1,250 1,250
2 1000 50 100 1000 500 $-1,250 -250
tion 4.3.3.1, we determinewhether Agent 1 and Agent 2 satisfy the stand-alone upper
bound.
Agent 1:
U1(x1, t1) ￿≤U1(ω,0) as 1,250 > 1,000. Thus, Agent 1 violates the stand-alone upper
bound.
Agent 2:
U2(x2, t2) ≤U2(ω,0) as −250 < 1,000. Thus, Agent 2 satisfies the stand-alone upper
bound.
The introduction of the stand-alone upper bound to a fair division trading scheme
places a utility ceiling on each agent based on the amount of transfer payments they
are allowed to receive. Once an agent reaches this utility ceiling he is considered sa-
tiated. An agent can be satiated either at the start with his initial entitlement and
remain satiated through the trading, or he can start out unsatiated with his initial
entitlement and become satiated through trading. It is important to note that many
agents will never reach their satiation utility, but a trading scheme is still considered
fair becuase the agents are individually rational i.e. at least aswell off as at their initial
entitlement.
Definition 4.3.3.3. An agent is satiated in his consumption of the common resource
at his entitlement level if he has zero marginal utility for any xi >wi . As w ￿wi , this
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implies
vi (wi )= vi (w). (4.3.3.4)
An agent who is satiated in his consumption of the common resource at his final
allocation level has an utility function equal to his stand-alone upper bound,
Ui (xi , ti )= vi (xi )+ ti = vi (w). (4.3.3.5)
Proposition 4.3.3.6. Let (xi , ti )i∈I be a solution to the fair division problem E that
satisfies individual rationality and the stand-alone upper bound. Then all agents who
are satiated in the usage of the common resource at their entitlement level receive an
allocation (xi , ti ), where ti = vi (w)− vi (xi ).
Proof. Let (xi , ti )i∈I be a solution F to E that satisfies individual rationality and the
stand-alone upper bound, and suppose that Agent i is satiated. By the definition of
individual raitonality and the stand-alone upper bound, we know
vi (ωi )￿ vi (xi )+ ti ￿ vi (w) for all i ∈ I .
As i ∈ I is satiated, themarginal utility for Agent i of any xi >ωi is zero. Thus vi (ωi )=
vi (w). Therefore,
ti = vi (w)− vi (xi ) for all i ∈ I .
Thus we know how to find ti in terms of vi (w) and vi (xi ) for satiated agents. In
the next section, I will show how to find ti for all agents, those who are satiated and
are not satiated with the boundedWalrasian solution.
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4.3.4 The BoundedWalrasian Solution
To find a solution that satisfy the fourth equity criterion, the stand-alone upper
bound, Helm (2008) constructed the bounded Walrasian solution, which is a varia-
tion of the Walrasian equilibrium.
The bounded Walrasian solution requires that all agents satisfy the stand-alone
upper bound while still maximizing utility across all agents, i.e., guaranteeing Pareto
efficiency. To maximize utility, yet not violate the upper bound agents may receive
either:
(1) their stand-alone utility and the excess utility is redistributed or
(2) their utility-maximizing transfer payment plus some redistributed utility.
Which transfer payment each agent receives depends on whether the agent is
ever satiated or not. Agents who are satiated with their intitial entitlement or receive
their stand-alone utility through redistribution (those in the set S) receive option 1,
i.e., ti = vi (ω− vi (xi ). Agents who are never satiated (those in the set I\S) receive
option 2, i.e., ti = p(ωi − xi )+λ. The following definition lays out a minimum test
that determines whether an allocation has appropriate transfer payments to be con-
sidered a boundedWalrasian solution.
Definition 4.3.4.1. Let the allocation x = (xi )i∈I and the price p ∈ R+ constitute the
Walrasian equilibrium. Consider some transfer payments (ti )i∈I with the constraint
that
￿
i∈I ti = 0. Let S = {k ∈ I |tk = vk(w)− vk(xk)}. If for all i ∈ I ,
ti =min
￿
vi (ω)− vi (xi ),p(ωi −xi )+
￿
k∈S[p(ωk −xk)− (vk(ω)− vk(xk))]
|I\S|
￿
,
then (xi , ti )i∈I is a boundedWalrasian solution.
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We will refer to
ti =min
￿
vi (ω)− vi (xi ),p(ωi −xi )+
￿
k∈S[p(ωk −xk)− (vk(ω)− vk(xk))]
|I\S|
￿
from Definition 4.3.4.1 as the minimum test for an allocation, (xi , ti )i∈I . If the ti
“passes” the minimum test, i.e. the minimum test is true for all i ∈ I , then the alloca-
tion is a boundedWalrasian solution.
Note 4.3.4.2. Notice that within Definition 4.3.4.1 the redistribution is defined as
λ=
￿
k∈S[p(ωk −xk)− (vk(ω)− vk(xk))]
|I\S| .
We know the minimum test suffices for determining whether a fair division al-
location is a bounded Walrasian solution or not for both satiated and unsatiated
agents. If an agent is satiated the transfer payment that brings him up to his stand-
alone utility is smaller than his utility maximizing transfer payment. If an agent is
unsatiated his utility maximizing transfer payment plus some equally redistributed
utility is smaller than the transfer payment that brings him up to his stand-alone
utility.
Remark 4.3.4.3. It is important to note that how λ redistributes the excess utility
is not an equity criterion. λ should be an equal per capita redistribution of utility,
meaning the total amount of utility to be redistributed is divided by the number of
unsatiated agents, and then each unsatiated agent receive an equal portion, instead
of a proportional redistribution, where each agent receives a certain number of emis-
sion permits in proportion to their current emission levels. Proportional and there-
fore unequal redistribution could possibly lead to a violation of envy-freeness. Helm
also notes that “the funds to be reallocated arise from a free service of members of S,
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from which the other agents should benefit equally” [Helm 2008].
Although Definition 4.3.4.1 gives us a condition for determining whether an allo-
cation is the bounded Walrasian solution or not, to actually find the bounded Wal-
rasian solution wemust follow the following algorithm.
Algorithm 4.3.4.4. (The BoundedWalrasian Solution Algorithm).
Let the allocation x = (xi )i∈I and the price p ∈ R+ constitute the Walrasian equi-
librium. Consider transfer payments that maximize each agent’s utility at the Wal-
rasian equilibrium, i.e., ti ,1 = p(ωi −xi ) with the constraint that￿i∈I ti ,1 = 0.
Step 1: If this freemarket allocation (xi , ti ,1)i∈I , passes theminimum test (4.3.4.1),
then we have a boundedWalrasian solution, and we are done.
If the allocation (xi , ti ,1)i∈I fails theminimum test, there is at least one agent who
is overcompensated. We must redistribute the excess utility from overcompensated
agents to unsatiated agents, i.e.,
λ1 =
￿
k∈S[p(ωk −xk)− (vk(ω)− vk(xk))]
|I\S| ,
where
￿
k∈S[p(ωk−xk)−(vk(ω)−vk(xk))] is the excess utility of the overcompensated
agents. Thus, agents who were overcompensated now receive a transfer payment
that brings them up to their stand-alone utility, i.e., ti ,2 = vi (ω)− vi (xi ), and agents
who were unsatiated now receive their utility maximizing transfer payment plus the
equal redistribution, i.e., ti ,2 = p(ωi −xi )+λ1.
Step 2: If this new allocation (xi , ti ,2)i∈I , passes the minimum test (4.3.4.1), then
we have a boundedWalrasian solution, and we are done.
If the allocation (xi , ti ,2)i∈I fails theminimum test, there is at least one agent who
CHAPTER 4. MODEL 47
is overcompensated. We must redistribute the excess utility from overcompensated
agents to unsatiated agents, i.e.,
λ2 =
￿
k∈S[p(ωk −xk)− (vk(ω)− vk(xk))]
|I\S| ,
where
￿
k∈S[p(ωk−xk)−(vk(ω)−vk(xk))] is the excess utility of the overcompensated
agents. Thus, agents who were overcompensated now receive a transfer payment
that brings them up to their stand-alone utility, i.e., ti ,3 = vi (ω)− vi (xi ), and agents
who were unsatiated now receive their utility maximizing transfer payment plus the
equal redistribution, i.e., ti ,3 = p(ωi −xi )+λ2.
...
Step n−1: If this new allocation (xi , ti ,n−1)i∈I passes the minimum test (4.3.4.1),
then we have a boundedWalrasian solution, and we are done.
If the allocation (xi , ti ,n−1)i∈I fails the minimum test, there is at least one agent
who is overcompensated. We must redistribute the excess utility from overcompen-
sated agents to unsatiated agents, i.e.,
λn−1 =
￿
k∈S[p(ωk −xk)− (vk(ω)− vk(xk))]
|I\S| ,
where
￿
k∈S[p(ωk−xk)−(vk(ω)−vk(xk))] is the excess utility of the overcompensated
agents. Thus, agents who were overcompensated now receive a transfer payment
that brings them up to their stand-alone utility, i.e., ti ,n = vi (ω)− vi (xi ), and agents
who were unsatiated now receive their utility maximizing transfer payment plus the
equal redistribution, i.e., ti ,n = p(ωi −xi )+λn−1.
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Step n: This new allocation (xi , ti ,n)i∈I must pass the minimum test (4.3.4.1), i.e.
we have a boundedWalrasian solution, and we are done.
We will later prove that Algorithm 4.3.4.4 must terminate with a bounded Wal-
rasian solution, and therefore the boundedWalrasian solution exists. But first to bet-
ter understand how the Algorithmworks, we provide an example of a trading scheme
between 4 agents. The example follows the step-by-step process of Algorithm 4.3.4.4
to eventually find the boundedWalrasian solution.
Example 4.3.4.5. Suppose 4 agents participate in a trading scheme. The price, p =
0.012, is defined as the amount where all 4 agents’ marginal utilities are equal. Let
ω= 200. Refer to the Appendix for the utility fuctions of each agent.
Step 1: Find the free market allocation (xi , ti ,1)i∈I , where ti ,1 = p(ωi − xi ). We
maximize utility across all agents bound by the constraint that
￿
i∈I ti ,1 = 0. Please
refer to Table 7.2.1 in the Appendix.
Since Agent 2 does not pass theminimum test, i.e., p(ω2−x2)> v2(ω)−v2(x2), we
know that Agent 2 is overcompensated. Therefore the excess utility, 0.07, must be re-
distributed between the three agents who are unsatiated, i.e., p(ωi − xi ) < vi (ω)−
vi (xi ). So λ1 = 0.07/3 = 0.022, and λ1 is added to ti ,1 to Agents 1, 3, and 4, i.e.,
ti ,2 = p(ωi −xi )+λ1.
Step 2: Determinewhether the newallocation (xi , ti ,2)i∈I satisfiesDefinition 4.3.4.1.
Please refer to Table 7.2.2 in the Appendix.
Since Agent 4 does not pass theminimum test, i.e., p(ω4−x4)+λ1 > v4(ω)−v4(x4),
we know that Agent 4 is overcompensated. Therefore the excess utility, 0.02, must
be redistributed between the two agents who are unsatiated, i.e., p(ωi − xi )+λ1 <
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vi (ω)− vi (xi ). So λ2 = 0.02/2 = 0.01, and λ2 is added to ti ,2 to Agents 1, and 3 i.e.,
ti ,3 = p(ωi −xi )+λ2.
Step 3: Determinewhether the newallocation (xi , ti ,3)i∈I satisfiesDefinition 4.3.4.1.
Please refer to Table 7.2.3 in the Appendix.
Since all agents pass the minimum test, the allocation (xi , ti ,3)i∈I is the bounded
Walrasian solution.
Now that we have shown an example of how to find the bounded Walrasian so-
lution, we must prove that Algorithm 4.3.4.4 always terminates and that the termi-
nation is a bounded Walrasian solution, and thus the bounded Walrasian solution
exists.
Proposition 4.3.4.6. Given some fair division problem E ≡ {Ui ,ωi }i∈I , the Algorithm
4.3.4.4 always terminates at a boundedWalrasian solution.
Proof. Suppose E ≡ {Ui ,ωi }i∈I is a fair division problem for a scarce common re-
source, ω, among n agents. Since ω is scarce, we know that not all agents can be
satiated at once, i.e. for any allocation of ω, there exists some agent i ∈ I who is not
satiated. Suppose we have (xi )i∈I and p of the Walrasian equilibrium and an initial
ti ,1 := p(ωi −xi ). Let
S = {r ∈ S|tr ≥ vr (ω)− vr (xr )}
I\S = {s ∈ I\S|ts ≤ vs(ω)− vs(xs)}
Follow the process of Algorithm 4.3.4.4, as follows.
Step 1: If ti ,1 ≤ vi (ω)− vi (xi ) for all agents i ∈ I , then (xi , ti ,1)i∈I is a bounded
Walrasian solution, and we are done.
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If not, let tr,2 = vr (ω)− vr (xr ) for all agents r ∈ S such that tr,1 ≥ vr (ω)− vr (xr ).
Also, let ts,2 = p(ωs−xs)+λ1 for all agents s ∈ I\S such that ts,1 ≤ vs(ω)−vs(xs), where
λ1 =
￿
r∈S[p(ωr −xr )− (vr (ω)− vr (xr ))]
|I\S| .
Step 2: If ti ,2 ≤ vi (ω)− vi (xi ) for all agents i ∈ I , then (xi , ti ,2)i∈I is a bounded
Walrasian solution, and we are done.
If not, let tr,3 = vr (ω)− vr (xr ) for all agents r ∈ S such that tr,2 ≥ vr (ω)− vr (xr ).
Also, let ts,3 = p(ωs−xs)+λ2 for all agents s ∈ I\S such that ts,2 ≤ vs(ω)−vs(xs), where
λ2 =
￿
r∈S[p(ωr −xr )− (vr (ω)− vr (xr ))]
|I\S| .
...
Step n − 1: If ti ,n−1 ≤ vi (ω)− vi (xi ) for all agents i ∈ I , then (xi , ti ,n−1)i∈I is a
boundedWalrasian solution, and we are done.
If not, let tr,n = vr (ω)− vr (xr ) for all agents r ∈ S such that tr,n−1 ≥ vr (ω)− vr (xr ).
Also, let ts,n = p(ωs − xs)+λn−1 for all agents s ∈ I\S such that ts,n−1 ≤ vs(ω)− vs(xs),
where
λn−1 =
￿
r∈S[p(ωr −xr )− (vr (ω)− vr (xr ))]
|I\S| .
Step n: Since there are n agents participating in the fair division, if we have not
yet found a bounded Walrasian solution we know all other agents, besides Agent n,
are satiated with their stand-alone utility as they all receive a transfer payment ti ,n =
vi (ω)−vi (xi ). But since all agents are satiated, except for one, we know the one agent
must be unsatiated by the assumption that the common resource, ω, is scarce, i.e.
there exists some agent i ∈ I who is not satiated. This remaining unsatiated agent
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must be Agent n. Therefore, we know Agent n’s transfer payment is
tn,n = p(ωn −xn)+λn−1
≤ vn(ω)− vn(xn)
since Agent n is in I\S. Thus, ti ,n ≤ vi (ω)− vi (xi ) for all i ∈ I . Thus, (xi , ti ,n)i∈I is a
boundedWalrasian solution.
Thus, Algorithm 4.3.4.4 always terminates at a boundedWalrasian solution. Also,
the process is guarenteed to terminate since the common resource is scarce.
Although the boundedWalrasian solution satisfies the stand-alone upper bound
since the highest utility an agent may receive is their stand-alone utility, it still does
not address the issue of envy-freeness discussed in the last section. Again, refer to
Remark 4.1.3.7. In the next section, we examine why the Walrasian equilibrium (and
therefore the bounded Walrasian solution) does not guarentee envy-freeness. Helm
proposes a variation to envy-freeness, envy-freeness with respect to a compensation
rule, which shows that agents do not want one another’s final permit allocation, xi .
4.3.5 Envy-freeness with Respect to a Compensation Rule
We now return to the discussion of the third equity criterion, envy-freeness (Def-
inition 4.3.1.4), from Section 4.1.3. Consider how envy-freeness applies to Helm’s
model.
According to Definition 4.3.1.4, within Helm’s model an allocation (xi , ti )i∈I is
envy-free if for all pairs of agents i , j ∈ I ,
vi (xi )+ ti ≥ vi (x j )+ t j . (4.3.5.1)
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Suppose the agents’ transfer payments are based on the Walrasian equilibrium,
i.e., their revenue or expenditure for the emission permits. Within the Walrasian
equilibrium, revenue and expenditure are both calculated bymultiplying the change
in an agent’s permit quantity by the market price, ti = p(ωi −xi ). So substituting this
into Equation (4.3.5.1), we get
vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi )≥ vi (x j )+p(ω j −x j ) (4.3.5.2)
for all pairs of agents i , j ∈ I .
Remark 4.3.5.3. Notice that ti = p(ωi−xi ), is a function ofωi and xi (p is a constant).
The following example illustrates a violation of envy-freeness. We will use this
example to better understand what conditions lead to envy-freeness or the violation
of envy-freeness.
Example 4.3.5.4. Suppose Agent 1 and Agent 2 participate in an emission permit
trading scheme with 100 permits that each cost $25. Suppose Agents 1 and 2 have
the same preferences for emission permits, i.e., v1(xi )= v2(xi ) for all xi . The agents’
beginning and final permit allocations and utilities are defined in the table below.
Table 4.3.2: Descriptive Table for Example 4.3.5.4
Agents ωi xi vi (xi ) vi (x j ) ti
1 60 50 500 500 $250
2 40 50 500 500 $-250
Using the usual definition of envy-freeness (4.3.1.4) with reference to Equation
(4.3.5.2), we determine whether Agent 1 and Agent 2 are envy-free.
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Agent 1:
v1(x1)+p(ω1−x1)= 500+25(10)= 750
v1(x2)+p(ω2−x2)= 500+25(−10)= 250.
750≥ 250. So Agent 1 is envy-free.
Agent 2:
v2(x2)+p(ω2−x2)= 500+25(−10)= 250
v2(x1)+p(ω1−x1)= 500+25(10)= 750.
250 ￿≥ 750. So Agent 2 envies Agent 1.
Thus, Example 4.3.5.4 violates the usual definition of envy-freeness withinHelm’s
emission permit trading scheme. But why does this violation occur?
It is not unusual that an Walrasian equilibrium violates the usual definition of
envy-freeness. Most markets are not envy-free because agent have different budget
sets–a set of possible allocations that the agent can afford. In Example 4.3.5.4, the
agents’ budget sets are ωi . The agents have the same utility functions and end up
with final allocations of the same number of emission permits. The only difference
between the two agents is that Agent 1 has ω1 = 60 that is larger than Agent 2’s ω2 =
40. Because of this difference in their ωi ’s, Agent 2 envies Agent 1. In order for both
agents to be envy-free, they must have equal initial entitlements, i.e. ω1 =ω2 = 50.
Now, consider another example where the agents have equal initial entitlements,
but different utility function. The following example illustrates conditions that will
most likely lead to envy-freeness.
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Example 4.3.5.5. Suppose Agent 1 and Agent 2 participate in an emission permit
trading scheme with 100 permits that each cost $25. Suppose Agent 1 has a higher
marginal utility than Agent 2 up to 55 permits. The agents’ beginning and final per-
mit allocations and utilities are defined in the table below.
Table 4.3.3: Descriptive Table for Example 4.3.5.5
Agents ωi xi vi (xi ) vi (x j ) ti
1 50 55 600 490 $-125
2 50 45 450 550 $125
Using the usual definition of envy-freeness (4.3.1.4) we determine whether Agent
1 and Agent 2 are envy-free.
Agent 1:
v1(x1)+p(ω1−x1)= 600+25(−5)= 725
v1(x2)+p(ω2−x2)= 490+25(5)= 615.
725≥ 615. So Agent 1 is envy-free.
Agent 2:
v2(x2)+p(ω2−x2)= 450+25(5)= 575
v2(x1)+p(ω1−x1)= 550+25(−5)= 425.
575≥ 425. So Agent 2 is envy-free.
Thus, both agents are envy-free, even though they have different utility functions.
Although the agents may envy one another if the difference in their utility functions
and final permit allocations is large enough, the main point is equal initial entitle-
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ments is a condition of envy-freeness for Helm’s model.
We know that equal initial entitlements across agents is not a politically realis-
tic solution for Helm’s model because large and powerful countries, like the United
States, would never agree to participate in the emission trading scheme. It is impor-
tant that the participating countries believe the starting point (initial entitlements)
and the ending point (final allocation) are both fair. Helm argues the bounded Wal-
rasian solution guarentees the latter because it is Pareto efficient, individually ratio-
nal, envy-free with respect to a compensation rule (4.3.5.6), and satisfies the stand-
alone upper bound, which will be proved in Section 4.3.6. To guarentee the former,
we must define a “fair” manner if dividing up the initial entitlements.
Even though agents may still envy one another’s intitial entitlements, they are
subject to a rule that distributes the initial permits, which can be justified as reason-
able because the agents are “entitled” to different amounts of permits. Helm (2008)
uses an interesting analogy to illustrate how entitlements can be unequal and still be
“fair.”
Suppose that the wife of a deceased husband receives a share of the in-
heritance that is unambiguously more valuable than the share of a re-
mote relative. Then the [usual definition] of envy-freeness is not applica-
ble because the two are unequally entitled to the inheritance. [Helm 2008]
There is an argument that theUnited States is entitled to a larger potion of the ini-
tial emission permits than Switzerland because the U.S. has the largest economy in
the world. We will not delve into this volatile debate, but simply draw on themethod
of the most widely accepted international climate change agreement, the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. The Kyoto Protocol required countries to reduce their emission to 5.2% less
than their 1990 emission amount. Thus, since we have decided on a “fair” rule for
reduction, agents can justify their initial entitlement to one another.
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We have shown that the usual definition of envy-freeness is not useful to Helm’s
model by the above justification because envy-freeness only works if the agents have
equal initial entitlements. Still, Helm wants to impose a variation of envy-freeness
to show that agents do not want one another’s final permit allocation, xi . Helm’s
variation to envy-freeness is called “envy-freeness with respect to a compensation
rule.”
Definition 4.3.5.6. Let x≡ (x1, ...,xi , ...,x j , ...,xn) be an allocation vector of the com-
mon resource, and denote by xˆij ≡ (x1, ...,x j , ...,xi , ...,xn) the same vector with trans-
posed entries for agents i and j . A compensation rule is a function Ti (x) that asso-
ciates for every agent i ∈ I to every x a level of compensation to be paid or received.
It is required that
￿
i∈I Ti (x) = 0. An allocation (xi ,Ti (x))i∈I from justifiable entitle-
ments to the common resource is envy-free with respect to the compensation rule
Ti (x) for the fair division problem E if for all pairs of agents, i , j ∈ I :
vi (xi )+Ti (x)￿ vi (x j )+Ti (xˆij).
Note: This definition is Helm’s third equity criterion for his fair division model, in-
stead of envy-freeness.
To better understandwhat this definition is sayingwe consider the situationwhere
ti = p(ωi −xi ) as in Equation (4.3.5.2). But this time, ti is replaced with our compen-
sation rule, Ti (x).
Remark 4.3.5.7. Refering back to Remark 4.3.5.3, this time Ti (x)= p(ωi −xi ) is only a
function of xi (p and ωi are constants). When we consider xˆij, Ti (xˆij)= p(ωi −x j ), so
Ti (xˆij) is a function of x j .
We now redefine the usual definition of envy-freeness within Helm’s model to
envy-freeness within Helm’s model with respect to the Ti (x)= p(ωi − xi ) compensa-
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tion rule. To do this we substitute Ti (x)= p(ωi − xi ) for ti and Ti (xˆij)= p(ωi − x j ) for
t j into Equation (4.3.5.1), and get
vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi )￿ vi (x j )+p(ωi −x j ) (4.3.5.8)
for all pairs of agents i , j ∈ I .
We return again to Example 4.3.5.4 to better illustrate thewhat envy-freenesswith
respect to a compensation rule means.
Example 4.3.5.9. Refer to the table in Example 4.3.5.4. Using the definition of envy-
freeness with respect to a compensation rule (4.3.5.6) with reference to Equation
4.3.5.8, we determine whether Agent 1 and Agent 2 are envy-free with respect to a
compensation rule.
Agent 1:
v1(x1)+p(ω1−x1)= 500+25(10)= 750
v1(x2)+p(ω1−x2)= 500+25(10)= 750.
750≥ 750. So Agent 1 is envy-free with respect to a compensation rule.
Agent 2:
v2(x2)+p(ω2−x2)= 500+25(−10)= 250
v2(x1)+p(ω2−x1)= 500+25(−10)= 250.
250≥ 250. So Agent 2 is envy-free with respect to a compensation rule.
To further illustrate the difference between the usual definition of envy-freeness
and envy-freeness with respect to a compensation rule, we consider another exam-
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ple of an emission trading scheme.
Example 4.3.5.10. Suppose China and Mongolia are in a global emission permits
trading scheme with the 192 members of the United Nations. Mongolia will have a
very low initial entitlement of emission permits, say 2, compared to China’s 20, by
some redetermined justifable initial entitlement rule. Let p = $10.
Table 4.3.4: Descriptive Table for Example 4.3.5.10
Agents ωi xi ti Ti (x) Ti (xˆij)
Mongolia 2 1 10 10 -160
China 20 18 20 20 190
DoesMongolia envy China using the usual definition of envy-freeness (4.3.5.1)?:
UM (1,10) ￿≥UM (18,20)
Mongolia envies China as the utility functions are monotonic by construction.
Does Mongolia envy China using envy-freeness with respect to a compensation
rule, where the compensation rule is Ti (x)= p(ωi −xi ) (4.3.5.8)?:
We calculate TM (xˆCM)= p(ωM −xC )= 10(2−18)=−160. So,
UM (1,10)≥?UM (18,−160).
Unlike the usual definition, it is unclear whether the above inequality is true or
not withoutmore information. But this is the sort of outcomewe are looking for with
envy-freeness with respect to a compensation rule. The uncertainty stems from the
question of whether Mongolia will be willing to pay the very large total cost of these
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permits, because it would need to buy 18 additional permits to match China’s final
allocation number, TM (xˆCM).
Quite often this large additional cost is less than the additional utility gained from
having these permits, which means Mongolia would be envy-free with respect to a
compensation rule. But if the cost is worth it, Mongolia would have simply choosen
xM = 18 as its final allocation because each agent maximizes its own utility.
Now thatwe understandwhat envy-freenesswith respect to a compensation rule,
we consider envy-freeness with respect to the BWS compensation rule.
Definition 4.3.5.11. An allocation (xi ,Ti (x))i∈I , where
Ti (x)=min
￿
vi (ω)− vi (xi ),p(ωi −xi )+
￿
k∈S[p(ωk −xk)− (vk(ω)− vk(xk))]
|I\S|
￿
,
is envy-free with respect to the BWS compensation rule for justifiable entitlements if
for all pairs of agents, i , j ∈ I :
vi (xi )+Ti (x)￿ vi (x j )+Ti (xˆij).
4.3.6 Does the BoundedWalrasian Solution Satisfy the Four Equity
Criteria?
Now, we must show that the bounded Walrasian solution satisfies all four equity
criteria, Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, the stand-alone upper bound, and
envy-freeness with respect to a compensation rule.
Theorem 4.3.6.1. The boundedWalrasian solution satisfies:
1) Pareto efficiency,
2) individual rationality,
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3) the stand-alone upper bound, and
4) envy-freeness with respect to the BWS compensation rule for justifiable entitle-
ments.
Proof. Suppose the allocation (xi , ti )i∈I is a boundedWalrasian solution. By the def-
inition of the BWS (4.3.4.1), we know the allocation (xi )i∈I and the price p ∈R+ are a
Walrasian equilibrium. Let
S = {r ∈ S|tr ≥ vr (ω)− vr (xr )}
I\S = {s ∈ I\S|ts ≤ vs(ω)− vs(xs)}
where S is the set of agents who are satiated, and I\S is the set of agents who are
unsatiated.
1) Pareto efficiency. We must show the BWS allocation (xi , ti )i∈I is Pareto efficient.
ByNote 4.3.2.2, we know the allocation (xi )i∈I is Pareto efficient. Further, by Proposi-
tion 4.3.1.6 we know (xi )i∈I maximizes utility across all agents. Since the BWS simply
redistributes utility among the agents, but does not change the total utility we know
that (xi , ti )i∈I alsomaximizes the sumof total utility for all agents. So again by Propo-
sition 4.3.1.6, the BWS allocation (xi , ti )i∈I is Pareto efficient.
2) Individual rationality. Wemust show the BWS allocation (xi , ti )i∈I is individually
rational, i.e.
vi (xi )+ ti ≥ vi (ωi ) for all i ∈ I .
To prove this we will prove individual rationality with two cases, for those who are
satiated and for those who are not.
Case 1: Suppose j ∈ S. Under the bounded Walrasian solution, we know all agents in
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S have a transfer payment t j = v j (w)− v j (x j ) by Algorithm 4.3.4.4. Then
v j (x j )+ t j = v j (x j )+ v j (w)− v j (x j )
= v j (w) for all j ∈ S.
Case 2: Suppose i ∈ I\S. Under the bounded Walrasian solution, we know all agents
in I\S have a transfer payment ti = p(ωi − xi )+λ, where λ ≥ 0 by Algorithm 4.3.4.4.
Then
vi (xi )+ ti = vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi )+λ
≥ vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi ) as λ≥ 0
≥ vi (ωi ) for all i ∈ I\S,
since we know the allocation (xi )i∈I is individually rational by Note 4.3.2.2.
Thus, we have shown vi (xi )+Ti (x)≥ vi (ωi ) for all i ∈ I .
3) Stand-alone upper bound.We must show the BWS allocation (xi , ti )i∈I satisfies
the stand-alone upper bound, i.e.,
vi (xi )+ ti ≤ vi (w) for all i ∈ I .
To prove this we will prove the BWS allocation satisfies the stand-alone upper bound
in two cases, for those who are satiated and for those who are not.
Case 1: Suppose j ∈ S. Under the bounded Walrasian solution, we know all agents in
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S have a transfer payment t j = v j (w)− v j (x j ) by Algorithm 4.3.4.4. Then
v j (x j )+ t j = v j (x j )+ v j (w)− v j (x j )
= v j (w)
≤ v j (w) for all j ∈ S.
Case 2: Suppose i ∈ I\S. Since i is unsatiated, we know Ui (xi , ti ) < vi (w) for all
i ∈ I\S.
Therefore, we have shown that vi (xi )+ ti ≤ vi (w) for all i ∈ I .
4) Envy-freeness with respect to the BWS compensation rule for justifiable entitle-
ments. We must show the BWS allocation (xi ,Ti (x))i∈I is envy-free with respect to
the BWS compensation rule for justifiable entitlements, i.e.,
vi (xi )+Ti (x)￿ vi (x j )+Ti (xˆij).
To prove this we will prove the BWS allocation is envy-free with respect to the BWS
compensation rule in two cases, for thosewho are satiated and for thosewho are not.
Case 1: Suppose j ∈ S. Under the bounded Walrasian solution, we know all agents in
S have a transfer payment Tj (x) = v j (w)− v j (x j ) by Algorithm 4.3.4.4. Suppose by
way of contradiction that Agent j envies Agent i with respect to the BWS compensa-
tion rule, where i ∈ I . Then
v j (x j )+Tj (x)< v j (xi )+Tj (xˆj,i)
By the definition of the stand-alone upper bound, we know Tj (xˆj,i) ≤ v j (ω)− v j (xi ).
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By substitution for Tj (x) and Tj (xˆj,i), we find
v j (x j )+ v j (w)− v j (x j )< v j (xi )+ v j (ω)− v j (xi ),
i.e.
v j (ω)< v j (ω).
This is a contradiction. Thus, Agent j does not envy Agent i with respect to the BWS
compensation rule, where i ∈ I .
Case 2: Suppose i ∈ I\S. We know x = (xi )i∈I and p constitute a Walrasian equilib-
rium by the definition of boundedWalrasian solution, i.e.
vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi )≥ vi (x j )+p(ωi −x j ) for all j ∈ I . (4.3.6.2)
Since Agent j ’s final allocation, x j , is also part of theWalrasian equilibrium, we know
v j (x j )+p(ω j −x j )≥ v j (xi )+p(ω j −xi ). (4.3.6.3)
Wemust show vi (xi )+Ti (x)≥ vi (x j )+Ti (xˆi,j) for all j ∈ I . Let
λ=
￿
k∈S
￿
p(wk −xk)− (vk(w)− vk(xk))
￿
|I\S|
denote the final amount of utility that is redistributed from agents in S to agents in
I\S at the last step in Algorithm 4.3.4.4 and λˆi , j denote the amount of utility that is
redistributed to i if xi and x j are transposed.
Remark 4.3.6.4. It is important to note that although λ and λˆi , j do not have any xi ’s
and x j ’s to transpose, but there is a concern that when they are transposed Agent j
receiving xi may force Agent j to become satiated. If this transpose causes Agent j
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to become satiated, this agent will move from I\S into S, and therefore increase the
quantity
￿
k∈S
￿
p(wk −xk)− (vk(w)− vk(xk))
￿
and decrease |I\S|, i.e., if the transpose
causes Agent j to enter S, and λˆi , j >λ. We will show that this never occurs.
To prove i ∈ I\S is envy-free with respect to the BWS compensation rule with
justifiable entitlement, we must show for all j ∈ I
vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi )+λ≥ vi (x j )+p(ωi −x j )+ λˆi , j .
We must know whether j is in S or I\S, so we break the proof into two parts: (a) if
j ∈ I\S and (b) if j ∈ S.
Part (a): Suppose j ∈ I\S. We know
0≥ p(ω j −x j )+λ− [v j (ω)− v j (x j )]
≥ p(ω j −x j )− [v j (ω)− v j (x j )] since λ≥ 0
≥ p(ω j −xi )− [v j (ω)− v j (xi )]
by subtracting v j (ω) from both sides of Equation (4.3.6.3). Thus, j remains in the set
I\S because the right hand of the inequality is even smaller than all of the left. So we
knowmin
￿
vi (ω)− vi (x j ),p(ωi −x j )+ λˆi , j
￿= p(ωi −x j )+ λˆi , j . Now, we must show
vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi )+λ≥ vi (x j )+p(ωi −x j )+ λˆi , j .
But by Equation (4.3.6.2), it would be sufficient to prove λ≥ λˆi , j . Since j remains in
I\S, there is no change to the agents in S, so there also no change to the amount of
redistribution, i.e. λ= λˆi , j .
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Part (b): Suppose j ∈ S. We must show
vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi )+λ≥ vi (x j )+min
￿
vi (ω)− vi (x j ),p(ωi −x j )+ λˆi , j
￿
.
If Agent j receives xi instead of x j , we know
￿
k∈S
￿
p(wk −xk)− (vk(w)− vk(xk))
￿
will
decrease by Equation (4.3.6.3). Thus λˆi , j ≤λ.
Since i ∈ I\S, we know
vi (ω)≥ vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi )+λ
≥ vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi )+ λˆi , j since λ≥ λˆi , j
≥ vi (x j )+p(ωi −x j )+ λˆi , j by Equation (4.3.6.3).
Thus, vi (ω)− vi (x j ) ≥ p(ωi − x j )+ λˆi , j . So, min
￿
vi (ω)− vi (x j ),p(ωi −x j )+ λˆi , j
￿ =
p(ωi −x j )+ λˆi , j . Therefore,
vi (x j )+min
￿
vi (ω)− vi (x j ),p(ωi −x j )+ λˆi , j
￿= vi (x j )+p(ωi −x j )+ λˆi , j .
Thus, as we know Equation (4.3.6.2) and λ≥ λˆi , j ,
vi (xi )+p(ωi −xi )+λ≥ vi (x j )+p(ωi −x j )+ λˆi , j .
Chapter 5
Data
This chapter examines the data used in our market simulation. In order to sim-
ulate the pollution levels and transfer payments the bounded Walrasian solution
would produce, we must have consistent and fluid data. Therefore, we used only
one source for each type of data that we gathered in hopes that although the data
may not be perfectly accurate at least it will be proportional across countries, so we
can compare the differences.
5.1 Marginal Abatement Cost Curves
The best tools for forecasting pollution reduction costs are marginal abatement
cost curves (MACCs). MACCs are projected estimates of the annuals costs of both
avoided and abated carbon emissions. This means they capture not only howmuch
it will cost to do additional carbon abatement, but also how much emissions are
“avoided” through intrinsic growth and technological advancement. The point of the
MACC is to measure the cost of additional abatement beyond “business as usual.”
The “business as usual” projection estimates the growth in carbon emission, mostly
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from the growing demand for energy and transportation, as well as the deforestation
of the tropics.
Consider Figure 7.2.1 in the Appendix, which is a MACC for Russia with a pro-
jected year of 2030. The vertical axis is the abatement cost per ton of carbon, and the
horizontal axis is the potential abatement of carbon per year. Each vertical bar is a
possible option the country has for reducing pollution, like recycling new waste or
improving the installation in residential buildings. Each possible option has a corre-
sponding potential abatement amount and cost. Therefore, the area of the bar can be
thought of as the expenditure (or revenue) for abatement. Any potential abatement
that occurs at a cost lower than e0 is considered a “negative” cost. Negative costs
indicate a “net benefit or savings to the economy over the lifecycle of the option.”
[McKinsey & Company]. These bars that are below the x-axis correspond to green
innovations that lead to net savings i.e., provide positive economic returns over time.
TheMACCswe use are developed byMcKinsey &Company. Although other think
tanks have developed their own versions of abatement curves–EnerData, Bloomberg
New Energy Finance–McKinsey & Company has made some of their curves publicly
available. MACCs are extremely valuable not only to those participating in carbon
trading systems, but energy companies (for deciding about long-term capital invest-
ment strategies) and policy-makers (for determining howmuch abatement a partic-
ular economy can afford and what technologies should be targeted for abatement).
McKinsey & Company has made public MACCs for ten countries–Australia, Brazil,
China, India, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United
States–as well as a global MACC. These are the ten countries that we use in our mar-
ket simulation. The global MACC is used to find the global market price for emission
permits for one ton of CO2. TheMACCs are used to find howmuch each country can
abate at a particular global market price.
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McKinsey & Company’s first step to developing their 2030 MACCs was finding
their “business-as-usual” projection. How McKinsey developed each business-as-
usual case varies from country to country depending on the information available.
For the global MACC, they used a growth model and made very important assump-
tion about future growth. If these assumptions were to change, the projection could
be greatly affected. The first assumption is that annual GDP growths for developed
and developing countries are 2.1% and 5.5%, respectively. Another is that global pop-
ulation growth is 0.9%, while 0.2% and 1.1% in developed and developing countries,
respectively. The last assumption is that oil is $60 per barrel. McKinsey & Company
chose all of these assumptions based on the International Energy Agency’s (IEA)
World Energy Outlook for 2007. They found that greenhouse gas emissions would
increase by about 55% from 2005 to 2030. From this 2030 business-as-usual forecast,
McKinsey evaluated the potential costs and benefits of more than 200 greenhouse
gas abatement opportunities across 21 world regions focusing on 10 sectors. These
sectors are power, petroleum and gas, cement, iron and steel, chemicals, transport,
buildings, waste, forestry, and agriculture. They incorporated detailed information
about abatement potential, investment and financing needs, and implementation
scenarios to gain a dynamic understanding of how abatement reductions could oc-
cur.
The other tenMACCs for the countrieswere developed in a generally similar fash-
ion, with differences based on the availability of information. Again, McKinsey &
Company first developed their 2030 business-as-usual model using forecasts from
either the national government or the IEA. Like the global business-as-usual model,
they also made some large assumptions about the countries’ future growth of GDP,
population, and emissions. To develop theMACC from the business-as-usualmodel,
McKinsey examined 120 to 200 greenhouse gas abatement opportunities for each
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country, usually across the five most important sectors–power, industry, transporta-
tion, buildings, and forestry/agriculture. McKinsey & Company assessed the tech-
nology levels within each sector and possible future advancements to appropriately
adjust the business-as-usual model to forecast potential future emission abatement.
5.2 CO2 Emission Levels and Population Data
Along with the MACCs, the fair division model requires more specific data for
each country about their recent CO2 emissions. Recent carbon emission data is used
to find howmuch each country must abate to reach their initial emission permit en-
titlement. We assume that current emissions, ci , are unrestricted, and can therefore
be used to calculate each country’s stand-alone utility, i.e. vi (ω) = vi (ci ). Also, we
know the current emission level, ci , less the abatement reduction at the global mar-
ket price, ai , is the final emission permit allocation, ci−ai = xi . Themost recent CO2
emissions data by country is for 2007 and comes from theWorld Bank’sWorld Devel-
opment Indicators. We also gathered the CO2 emission data for 1990 and population
for 2007 for each country from theWorld Development Indicators, so we can “fairly”
calculate initial emission permit entitlement, ωi , for our simulation.
We found that 2007 emissions for all ten countries participating in our market
simulation are about 17.2 gigatons of CO2. Thus, the emissions of the ten countries
within our simulation emitted the majority of 2007 global carbon emissions, about
27.2 gigatons of CO2.
The first important calculation wemust do is find the cap or number of emission
permit,ω. As discussed in Section 2.2, 1990 emission levels are a desirable mile mar-
ket for emission levels because it was the last time CO2 concentrations were below
350 ppm, i.e., the safe upper limit for climate change. We will use the same cap as
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called for in the Kyoto Protocol, a 5.2% reduction below 1990 emission levels. Al-
though the Protocol only applied this cap to Annex 1 countries, we are imposing it
on everyone because as discussed earlier broad participation is extremely impor-
tant. The total 1990 emission level for our ten countries is about 11.04 gigatons of
CO2. Thus, applying the 5.2% reduction,
ω= 11.04−11.04(0.052)= 10.5
Thus, the cap is about 10.5 gigatons of CO2. Since current emissions are about 17.2
gigatons CO2 for our ten countries, we must reduce annual emissions by about 6.7
gigatons.
The market price of emission permits is where the marginal abatement costs for
all ten countries are equal. To find this we used McKinsey’s global MACC. Since we
must reduce emission by about 6.7 gigatons of CO2 per year, we find $120 per ton of
CO2.
Now, that we have ω and p, we must find the initial entitlements, ωi . We dis-
cussed two possible “fair” and justifiable rules for dividing up initial entitlements: 1)
proportional to the 5.2% reduction of 1990 emission levels, or 2) per capita.
First, we discuss the proportional method. The proportional method is the more
likely option out of these two because more countries will agree to it. The propor-
tional method is based on the technique used in the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, initial en-
titlements are calculated from each country’s 1990 carbon emission level, but with
a 5.2% reduction. The difference from the Kyoto Protocol is that this reduction ap-
plies to all countries, not just developed or Annex 1 countries. To illustrate how the
proportional method is calculated we provide an example below.
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Example 5.2.0.1. (Calculating Proportional Initial Entitlements for Australia).
Refer to Table 7.2.4. Australia emitted 292.9 megatons of CO2 in 1990. To find the
proportional initial entitlement, ωi , we calculate
ωAustralia = 292.9−292.9(0.052)= 277.7
Thus, the Australia’s proportional initial entitlement is about 277.7megatons of CO2.
Second, we discuss the per capita method. The per capita method gives a sig-
nificant advantage to the world’s most populous countries, China and India. The
per capita method is not really a realistic option because the world’s most powerful
country, the United States, would never agree to it. It is important to include because
the per capita market simulation will illustrate why the stand-alone upper bound is
so important to the fair division model. To find the per capita initial entitlements,
we first divide the total available amount of emission permits, ω, by the total pop-
ulation of all ten countries. The result is the amount of emission permits that each
person receives. So to get the initial entitlement for each country, ωi , we multiplied
this result by the population of country i . To illustrate how the per capita method is
calculated we provide an example below.
Example 5.2.0.2. (Calculating Per Capita Initial Entitlements for Australia).
From above, we know ω = 10,500 megatons of CO2. Refer to Table 7.2.4. The total
population of all ten countries is 3,268,294,703. To find the emission permits per
capita, we calculate
10,500
3,268,294,703
= 0.0000032
Thus, each country will receive 3.2 emission permits for every 100,000 residents.
Again, refer to Table 7.2.4. Australia’s population is 21,874,900. So we then calculate
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Australia’s per capita intial entitlement by
ωAustralia = 21,874,900(0.0000032)= 70
Thus, the Australia’s per capita initial entitlement is about 70 megatons of CO2.
5.3 Utility Functions and Calibration
Helm’s model requires monotonic and quasilinear utility functions, Ui (xi , ti ) =
vi (xi )+ ti . But since agents are countries, instead of individuals, their utility func-
tions are social welfare functions and therefore must represent the preferences of
society. This may cause issues because most likely a certain level of pollution abate-
ment for a whole country might affect different individuals or groups in that country
differently. For example, an individual who commutes into the city for work will see
the prices of gas increase, increasing his costs and therefore lowering his utility. On
the other hand, an individual who lives in the city and rides his bike to work will
have increased utility by the higher gas prices because there are less car on the road,
so he does not have to worry about getting hit as much. This may be a problem
for the Pareto efficiency criterion. Even though a BWS allocation is Pareto efficient
for societal preferences, it may not be for individuals. We can argue against these
criticisms of the countries’ utility functions, if we assume that the individuals’ util-
ity functions are alsomonotonic and quasilinear, like the countries’ utility functions.
Since the individuals’ utility functions are quasilinear, we know social welfare ismax-
imized by choosing a level of pollution that maximizes the sum of everyone’s utility,
i.e. Proposition 4.3.1.6, but the agents are individuals, instead of countries. Thus, we
can then transfer money between individuals to redistribute the utility in such a way
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that everyone is better off than they were originally, so the outcome is Pareto effi-
cient for all individuals, as well as society. Whether this argument is true or not, to be
confident in the use of the countries’ utility functions, we assume that societal pref-
erences arise from some political mechanism that aggregates individual preferences
in a consistent manner over time.
Since we could not find suitable pollution utility functions for our ten countries,
we must create them. The utility functions should be calculated in a manner that
they are based on the country’s abatement costs and its current emissions. A coun-
try’s abatement costs,MACi (ai ), are a function of abatement amounts, ai , and come
from the MACCs fromMcKinsey & Company.
We first decided that the utility curves should be strictly convex because it is an
important assumption of theWalrasian equilibrium for Pareto efficiency. Differences
among countries that make some more susceptible (like those in tropical areas) to
climate change than other are considered irrelevant to the utility functions, because
we assume the cap on emissions, ω, that we chose is low enough so these climate
extremes will not occur. Therefore, we assume that all curves should have the same
functional form of square root functions, vi (xi )= zi (xi ) 12 , where zi represent the dif-
ferences in preference for abatement costs and current emission between agents.
We calibrate zi according to the countries’ current level of emissions, ci , and a
particular abatement cost, MACi (ai ). We chose the abatement cost to be $120, i.e.,
MACi (ai ) = 120 for all i ∈ I . Using McKinsey & Company’s MACCs, we can find a
specific abatement amount, ai , for each country that corresponds to theMACi (ai )=
120.
Note 5.3.0.3. Note that: ci −ai = xi .
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We differentiate the utility curve and find that marginal utility is
Mvi (xi )= 12zi (xi )
− 12 .
Since the marginal utility from polluting must be equal to the marginal savings from
not having to abate, we know
MACi (ai )=Mvi (xi )
=Mvi (ci −ai )
= 1
2
zi (ci −ai )− 12 .
Thus, we can solve for zi .
zi = 2MACi (ai )
(ci −ai )− 12
(5.3.0.4)
= 2(120)
(ci −ai )− 12
since MACi (ai )= 120. (5.3.0.5)
We plug in our values for ci and ai into Equation (5.3.0.5) for each country to find
their zi ’s. Refer to Table 2 in the Appendix for the values of ci , ai , and zi .
So we have created a calibrated utility curve for each country’s utility function,
i.e.,
Ui (xi , ti )= zi (xi ) 12 + ti for all i ∈ I .
Chapter 6
TheMarket Simulations and Results
This chapter examines and analyzes the results of our twomarket simulations for
proportional and per capita initial entitlements. We found some surprising results
for proportional initial entitlements. Also, that the stand-alone upper bound is an
important contstraint and the BWS final allocation is significantly different from the
free market allocation in both simulations.
Remark 6.0.0.1. Note that by the quasilinearity of the utility functions, 1 utility point
is equivalent to $1,000. Thesemonetary figures are extremely sensitive to any changes
in the MACCs, so we cannot place much reliance on them. But the results are still
important because they help us understand each country’s outcome in proportion
to one another. We hope that McKinsey & Company calculated all of the MACCs
in some consistent manner, so if some aspect of the forecasts is off, they will all be
incorrect by the same amount.
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6.1 Proportional Entitlements Market Simulation
The initial results from the emission permit market simulation with proportional
initial entitlements are in Table 7.2.5. The results were quite surprising because we
had expected that a free market with proportional initial entitlements would not vi-
olate the stand-alone upper bound. Five countries–Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and the United Kingdom–all failed the minimum test for the free market as
vi (ω)− vi (xi )< ti ,1 = p(ωi −xi ).
It occurred to us that maybe the stand-alone utilities for some of these countries
are not correct because they have been participating in the European Union Emis-
sion Trading Scheme for the past three years and so their current emissions are not
unrestricted, i.e., our assumption that vi (ci )= vi (ω) fails. Since Poland, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom all participate in the EU ETS, we altered their the stand-alone
utilities to reflect 1990 emission levels,mi , instead of current emissions. This means
vi (mi )= vi (ω) for Poland, Sweden, and the U.K. Table 7.2.6 is the ‘fixed’ results from
the emission permit market simulation with proportional initial entitlements.
Even thoughwe altered the stand-alone utilities of three countries, two countries–
Switzerland and Russia–are still failing the minimum test. This is an interesting re-
sult because it was also unexpected. During our preliminary examination of Helm’s
model, we believed that the stand-alone upper bound would not cause significant
differences to a traditional free market cap-and-trade scheme unless initial entitle-
mentswere allocated in aweirdmanner, like per capita or equally between countries.
Clearly, we were wrong. Russia is significantly overcompensated in the free market
for emission permits with a stand-alone violation that is about 27,000 utility points,
which is equivalent to about $27 billion. Russia has such significant gains because
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initial entitlements are based on a 5.2% reduction of 1990 emission levels. Over the
past twenty years, Russia has faced significant decreases in production, and therefore
emissions, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, they have plenty of extra
emission permits to sell at a profit. Switzerland also violates the stand-alone upper
bound, but at a much lesser extent, by about 500 utility points, which is equivalent
to $500 million. Switzerland’s current emissions are also lower than their 1990 lev-
els, which can account for their overcompensation. Table 7.2.7 illustrates the redis-
tribution of Russia and Switzerland’s overcompensation to the unsatiated agents in
the trading scheme. Each of the eight unsatiated agents receives some redistributed
utility, λ1 = 3,443, which is worth about $3.4 billion. Once this redistribution occurs,
no country is overcompensated, and both Russia and Switzerland are receiving their
stand-alone utilities.
6.2 Per Capita Initial Entitlements Market Simulation
The results from the emission permit market simulation with per capita initial
entitlements are in Table 7.2.8. The results were along the lines that we expectedwith
populous developing countries failing the minimum test, i.e. violating the stand-
alone upper bound. Large developing countries violate the upper bound because
they receive more initial entitlements than they need, and can therefore sell the ex-
cess for a large profit. On top of this, because these countries are developing they
have lower marginal abatement costs than a lot of the other countries, and there-
fore choose to sell additional permits and abate, rather than pollute and keep the
expensive permits. India and Brazil both initially violate the stand-alone constraint
by a lot, about $265 billion and $37 billion, respectively. Because there is such a
large violation amount, the redistribution to unsatiated agents is quite extensivewith
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λ1 = 37,722. Refer to Table 7.2.9. When the unsatiated countries receive their equal
redistribution amounts, two countries–Australia and Switzerland–are pushed over
their stand-alone utility and now fail the minimum test. Therefore, another redistri-
bution (Table 7.2.10) must take place giving λ2 = 6,598 to the remaining unsatiated
countries (note that India and Brazil are both receiving their stand-alone utility and
are therefore satiated, but not violating the upper bound). This is the last redistribu-
tion because no countries fail the minimum test, i.e. violate the stand-alone upper
bound.
In bothmarket simulations, the emission tradingmarket isworth about $1.88 tril-
lion and the countries always end up with the same final allocation of permits. The
difference is how the costs are divided among countries. It appears that the propor-
tional initial entitlement is a more “fair” method of initially allocation the emission
permits because the burden of costs are spread more equally across countries than
with the per capita initial entitlements. Three countries–Australia, China and India–
are buying permits and the rest of the countries are selling them. India is buying the
bulk of the permits worth about $63 billion. India must buy so many emission per-
mits because the country has experiencedmajor growth in the last twenty years, and
therefore increased their emissions significantly since 1990. The per capita initial
entitlements force the burden of the costs onto Russia and the United States, paying
about $52 billion and $286 billion, respectively, for their additional emission permits.
Politically, proportional initial entitlements are more feasible because more coun-
tries would be willing to participate in the trading scheme, where as with per capita
the United States would definitely opt out as they are burdened with the majority of
the costs.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This paper explores an alternative cap-and-trade systemproposedbyHelm (2008)
that uses four properties of fair division–Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, stand-
alone upper bound, and envy-freeness with respect to a compensation rule–to guar-
antee “fairness.” We illustrated possible outcomes of this fair division emission trad-
ing scheme, but simulating the emission trading market using a subset of ten coun-
tries. We used marginal abatement cost curves from McKinsey & Company and re-
cent emission data from theWorld Development Indictors to reasonably mimic what
results that would occur in a global emission trading scheme. We found the surpris-
ing result that the incorporation of the stand-alone upper bound into the Walrasian
solution leads to amuch differentmarket outcome, than a freemarket cap-and-trade
scheme. The stand-alone upper boundmay be a great addition to any cap-and-trade
scheme to guarantee that no countries are overcompensated within the trading sys-
tem.
There is no easy solution to global climate change. Whatever form of mitigation
that the United Nations eventually agrees on (if ever) must appease the vast major-
ity of the countries participating, including themost powerful–the United States and
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China. Although Helm’s scheme presents some promising results when it comes to
efficiency and envy-freeness, we find that the most important aspect of equal bur-
den sharing is how the initial entitlements are divided up. Helm supposes that en-
titlements are divided in some “equal” manner, but does not specify further. In this
paper, I proposed possible justifiable methods of dividing up initial entitlements–
proportional based on 1990 emissions and per capita. It is evident from the results
that that neither of these methods are satisfactory because the burden sharing is not
divided up in a logical manner. A suggestion for further research is exploring more
possible justifiable methods for dividing up initial entitlements, like a proportional
reduction from current emissions or an equal division between all countries.
Appendix
7.1 Model Appendix
Utility Functions 7.1.1. The Utility Functions for the Agents in Example 4.3.4.5:
U1(x1, t1)= 12x1x1+4 U2(x2, t2)=
8x2
x2+2
U3(x3, t3)= 12x3x3+4 U4(x4, t4)=
10x4
x4+3
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7.2 Figure and Tables Appendix
Figure 7.2.1: Russia’s Marginal Abatement Cost Curve for 2030 [McKinsey]
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